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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Well-being is increasingly used as a criterion to measure development 
outcomes, in the light of the now established critique of income as a 
satisfactory measure (UNDP, 1990). The aim of the key development policy 
document in Nigeria, Nigerian Vision 20:2020, is to improve the well-being 
of Nigerians.  
However, as well-being is an emerging and contested concept, this report 
explores how the well-being of urban citizens is understood specifically in 
Nigeria, and identifies the key issues for urban well-being as expressed by 
a selection of key stakeholders in Nigerian society. This is an important 
task in the Nigerian context, which is characterised by impressive and 
sustained growth rates juxtaposed alongside increasing rates of both 
income poverty and subjective poverty. 
This study analyses the discourses and views of 45 urban stakeholders 
strategically positioned at different levels of Nigerian society, as well as 
existing literature and documents.  
Based on White’s (2010) framework for the analysis of well-being and 
contemporary conceptualisations of citizenship, the analysis reveals three 
main trends affecting urban well-being: (i) rapid demographic changes that 
make it difficult for government to respond with adequate planning and 
interventions; (ii) a number of governance issues, particularly regarding 
power distribution, lack of city-level governance and the role of the state; 
(iii) the existence of stratified citizenship characterised by unequal access 
to services and rights based on socio-spatial discrimination and notions of 
indigeneity.  
Electricity, congestion, housing, youth unemployment, security and health 
are a number of key areas which were raised during interviews in which 
the inadequate and unequal provision of goods and services, underpinned 
by these three trends, affect urban well-being.  
An analysis of stakeholders’ conceptualisations of well-being showed how 
it is viewed in terms of basic needs to be achieved through economic 
growth, and how well-being is itself considered fundamental for 
productivity. Well-being was also understood through the broad notion of 
security, emphasising different dimensions beyond the material aspect. 
Finally, another understanding of well-being was as ‘social order’, a 
problematic idea at the root of existing and proposed policies.  
Policies for urban well-being present three characteristics: (i) policies are 
underpinned by the notion of restoring social order, with chaos and 
disorder (often associated with informality) seen as a cause of ill-being; (ii) 
the prominence of middle-class concerns and the exclusion of non-
indigenes and those living in poverty; (iii) government being seen as a 
provider of the enabling environment and infrastructure needed for 
private sector actors to deliver economic growth which purportedly lead to 
improved well-being. 
These characteristics were present in a number of policy concerns raised 
by stakeholders, including: decongestion policies; transport and road 
infrastructure; social security for unemployed; education and food 
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security. A generally negative view of urbanisation emerges with a strong 
emphasis on stopping rural-urban migration as a way to halt urban growth.  
The research has highlighted a range of very important citizenship 
practices to deliver goods and services essential to citizens’ well-being. 
These practices reveal the importance of autonomous collective action in 
the achievement of well-being. They also show the role that income levels 
and other social identities such as indigeneity play in such processes. While 
these processes mostly focus on the delivery of goods and services, in the 
context of a democratic government still in transition, they also become a 
platform for voice and the claiming of rights.  
A key problem that emerges and requires further research is the issue of 
the inappropriate planning taking place, which serves particular interests 
and further entrenches inequalities. The report encourages an open 
discussion on the current urban governance arrangements in Nigeria, 
particularly the division of roles between different tiers of government, 
and also on how city-level governance may enable citizenship practices 
that complement public interventions.  
The report also questions the effectiveness of strategies for urban well-
being solely focused on creating an enabling environment for investment 
and economic growth to address the concerns of the large majority of low-
income residents.  
In particular, the report indicates that policies often exclude the urban 
poor and non-indigenes and the removal of these discriminations is 
necessary for the achievement of well-being for all in Nigerian cities and 
towns.  
Finally the report acknowledges the importance of the state in providing or 
regulating the provision of a number of goods, services and infrastructure, 
whose provision in urban areas is still inadequate.
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INTRODUCTION 
Well-being is increasingly used as a criterion to measure development 
outcomes, in view of the now well-established critique of income as a 
satisfactory measure (UNDP, 1990). The aim of the key development policy 
document in Nigeria, Nigeria Vision 20:2020, is to improve the well-being 
of Nigerians.  
However, as well-being is an emerging and contested concept, this report 
explores how the well-being of urban citizens is understood specifically in 
Nigeria, and identifies the key issues for urban well-being as expressed by 
key stakeholders. This is an important task in the Nigerian context, which is 
characterised by impressive and sustained growth rates at the same time 
as increasing rates of both income and subjective poverty. 
The importance of measuring development outcomes through an 
understanding of well-being is consistent with the interest of the 
Government of Nigeria in understanding and measuring multi-dimensional 
poverty and with Nigerian engagement with the Multidimensional Poverty 
Peer Network. The introduction of the measurement of subjective poverty 
in Nigeria revealed that many more people than those captured by official 
standard statistics would consider themselves as poor.  
Analysing well-being 
Defining well-being is especially challenging because of the different ways 
in which the concept is understood in different contexts – and by different 
people. However, rather than being driven by a definition, researchers 
have focused on dimensions and descriptions (Dodge, Daly, Huyton, & 
Sanders, 2012). What various authors agree on is the multidimensional 
character of well-being and the fact that different dimensions are deeply 
intertwined.  
One way of classifying the different dimensions of well-being is through 
the person-centred framework developed by Sarah White and the Well-
being in Developing Countries Research Programme at the University of 
Bath.  
The basic working definition of well-being proposed by White includes: 
doing well, a material dimension referring to standards of living; feeling 
good, the subjective perception; as well as a dimension of doing good and 
feeling well, incorporating the idea of living a good life which emphasises 
the importance of people’s relationships with others (White, 2010, p. 160).  
The framework also considers three interdependent dimensions of well-
being: material; relational; and subjective. The material include assets, 
welfare, and standards of living. The relational is further divided into the 
social (social relations and access to public goods) and the human 
(capabilities, attitudes to life, and personal relationships). The subjective 
comprises two elements: perceptions of one’s own position; and cultural 
values, ideologies, and beliefs, including the cultural roots of material 
welfare or standards of living (White, 2010, p. 161).  
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The list below in Figure 1 further elaborates the different dimensions of 
well-being. 
 
Figure 1 White’s dimensions of well-being explained 
 The material concerns practical welfare and standards of living. 
 Objective aspects include: 
 income, wealth, and assets 
 employment and livelihood activities 
 levels of consumption. 
 Subjective aspects include: 
 satisfaction with income and wealth 
 assessment of one's standard of living compared with others' 
 assessment of present standard of living compared with past. 
 • The social concerns social relations and access to public goods. 
 Objective aspects include: 
 social, political, and cultural identities 
 violence, conflict, and (in )security 
 relations with the state: law, politics, welfare 
 access to services and amenities 
 networks of support and obligation 
 environmental resources. 
 Subjective aspects include: 
 perceptions of safety, respect, and discrimination 
 (di s)satisfaction with access to services 
 assessment of treatment support given or received 
 perceptions of environmental quality. 
 • The human concerns capabilities, attitudes to life, and personal 
relationships. 
 Objective aspects include: 
 household structure and composition 
 education, information, and skills 
 physical health and (di s)ability 
 relations of love and care. 
 Subjective aspects include: 
 (dis)satisfaction with levels of health, information, skills, 
education 
 self-concept and personality 
 sense of competence, (in)capability, and scope for influence 
 trust and confidence 
 religious faith. 
Source: White 2010, p. 163. The CC license does not apply to this figure. 
 
EXISTING EVIDENCE ON URBAN WELL-BEING  
Existing data on well-being in Nigerian cities is problematic and contested, 
making it difficult to provide a reliable picture of the situation in urban 
areas. This is a methodological limitation which will be discussed later in 
this report. However, there are a number of specific studies from which a 
variety of indicators can be drawn. These studies therefore provide a 
general, albeit limited, introduction to frame this report.  
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The following section outlines well-being indicators categorized according 
to the dimensions of White’s well-being framework, with a focus on the 
material and the relational dimensions. The subjective dimension of well-
being is not addressed in the literature.  
At a broad level, according to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
progress report, on almost all measures, poverty is more prevalent, deeper 
and severe in rural than in urban areas (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, 
p. 11). In most MDG indicators, the North (particularly North West and 
North East) is substantially worse off than the South (ibid., p. 11). 
However, at the same time, the incidence of urban poverty is recorded to 
be rising, from 35.4% in 2001 to 61.8% in 2010 (Anyanwu, 2012, p.9), and a 
National Bureau of Statistics report (National Population Commission 
(NPC) and ICF International, 2014) shows that income inequality is 
relatively higher in urban areas than in rural areas. 
A current and comprehensive indicator of well-being (or lack thereof) is 
the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), an international measure 
of acute poverty which captures the severe deprivations that each person 
faces at the same time with respect to ten indicators in three dimensions; 
education, health and living standards. The 2014 Global MPI (using 2011 
data) revealed that 43.3% of Nigerians are multidimensionally poor, 25.3% 
of whom live in severe poverty (OPHI, 2014). In addition to this another 
19.3% of Nigerians are vulnerable to poverty. With regards to the urban 
context, only 16.1% of the people are considered multidimensional poor, 
6.3% of whom live in severe poverty, while 21.3% are vulnerable to 
poverty.  
The major indicators contributing to the urban multidimensional poverty in 
Nigeria are the following: child mortality (any child has died in the family); 
nutrition (severe undernourishment of any adult or any child); school 
attendance (no child is attending school up to the age at which they should 
finish class 6); years of schooling (no household members has completed 
at least one year of schooling); and cooking fuel (the household cooks with 
dung, wood or charcoal). The MPI also shows a variation in well-being 
indicators that demonstrates a major regional divide in the country beyond 
rural and urban. For instance, while Lagos has an MPI of only 0.011, states 
in the North West and North East have very high MPI levels (e.g. Kebbi 
0.566 and Bauchi 0.600). 
 
Material well-being (assets, welfare, standards of living) 
As noted above, income inequality appears to be increasing in cities and is 
relatively higher in urban areas. Whilst some reports (Deloitte, 2012; 
Renaissance Capital, 2012) look at the size and incomes of the Nigerian 
middle class, the majority of whom reside in cities, to determine that a 
great number of Nigerians have made the jump from poor to middle class, 
others (Dulani, Mattes, & Logan, 2013; Oduh, 2012; Olokeusi, 2011) 
contend that rising incomes do not reflect the lived experience of urban 
residents and that in fact the middle class has experienced increased 
poverty or is at risk of falling into poverty. The decline of specific 
manufacturing sectors and the increase in foreign imports has been held 
responsible by some for exacerbating urban poverty in northern parts of 
the country (Burgis, 2009 in Potts 2012, p.1389). 
 4 
Unemployment rates in some key urban centres are as high as 50%, 
although this figure may not take into account rates of informal 
employment, which are high; according to a 2003 DFID study, in Lagos up 
to 70% work in the informal sector (Agunwamba et al, 2009, p. 41) and the 
majority of residents live at the subsistence level only (Aluko 2010, p. 69). 
The high cost of living in many Nigerian cities is reflected by data showing 
that 62.6% of urban household consumption expenditure is spent on food 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, p. 56). In addition, in 2006 the 
incidence of absolute poverty whereby households were experiencing 
difficulties in satisfying their food needs was just as serious in urban as in 
rural areas (Potts, 2012, p. 1389). These figures infer a lack of disposable 
income and therefore inability to build up assets for urban dwellers. 
Several articles (John, Mohammed, Pinto, & Nkanta, 2007; Last, 2000; 
Oruwari, 2006) also point to the economic and social disenfranchisement 
produced by unemployment and the inability to satisfy basic needs of 
urban life as reasons that people turn to crime and violence.  
Housing is another key requirement in the promotion of material well-
being, but access to affordable, quality housing is a huge problem 
confronting the urban poor in Nigerian cities. Housing construction in 
Nigeria has not kept pace with demand and there is an estimated deficit of 
16 million housing units nationwide (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, 
p.49), resulting in high costs and inaccessibility to the majority of the 
population.  
Lack of affordable housing for low income citizens facilitates the 
proliferation of informal settlements in cities. In Lagos, up to 50% of the 
population lives in informal settlements (Ademiyuli and Solanke 2008, in 
Agunwamba 2009, p.42) across some 200 different informal settlements 
across the city (Gandy, 2006 in Amao, 2012, p. 73). Nationally, UN-
HABITAT estimates that 70% of urban populations live in informal 
settlements (UN-HABITAT, in Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p. 52). The 
density of urban housing is also a well-being issue; low income households 
comprise 70% of the urban population but only inhabit 30% of the land 
(Onukwa, 2005 in Agunwamba 2009, p.42). Substandard quality of 
dwellings and a lack of sanitation services in such areas can lead to poor 
levels of well-being in terms of health.  
 
Relational well-being (social relations, access to public goods)  
In terms of social relations, a wide range of literature suggests that 
Nigeria's widespread conflict and insecurity stem from the complex 
relationship of its diverse ethnicities, its historical and political legacy from 
colonialism and post-colonialism, the oil industry, and poverty and 
inequality. In addition to this, another body of literature focuses on the 
distinctly urban character of violence in Nigeria. One reason for this is the 
concentrated and readily visible inequality and poverty in Nigerian cities. 
Several articles (John et al, 2007, Last, 2000, Oruwari, 2006) point to the 
economic and social disenfranchisement produced by unemployment and 
the inability to satisfy basic needs of urban life as reasons that people turn 
to crime and violence. This trend has distinct age and gender components, 
with the research indicating that some uneducated youth view 
participation in gangs as legitimate work (Oruwari, 2006) and that young 
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male urban migrants feel frustrated and undignified as their poverty 
means they cannot marry back home (Last, 2000). Some households move 
to other informal settlements farther away from livelihoods and 
community in order to escape the violence (Oruwari, 2006).  
Residents of informal settlements are often stigmatised because of the 
violence their neighbourhoods are known for (Amao, 2012) to the 
detriment of their economic and social opportunities. Increasing crime has 
an overarching detrimental effect on the well-being of all members of 
society (Nwaubani, 2013) but an overwhelmingly biased effect on the 
urban poor and those living in informal settlements.  
There is also evidence that suggests that experiences of gender based 
violence (GBV) are higher in urban areas than rural, and that women in 
particular experience higher rates of GBV from both partners and relatives 
in cities (Okemgbo, Omideyi and Odimegwu, 2002 in Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 2010, p.62), and when travelling to urban areas for work (Usman 
2010). At the same time, data from the 2013 National Demographic and 
Health Survey (NPC and ICF International, 2014) shows that women in 
urban areas are more likely to participate in household decision making 
than their rural counterparts, possibly as a result of the shifts in social and 
cultural structures that attend increasing rates of urbanisation and female 
participation in the workforce (Corroon et al, 2013).  
Access to public goods and services is an integral aspect of relational well-
being. In urban areas, demand for such services has increased along with 
rates of urbanisation but quality and coverage has not increased at the 
same pace (Olotuah, 2002 in Lanrewaju, 2012). Sanitation is a significant 
well-being issue in Nigerian cities; whilst 75.6% are reported to have access 
to improved drinking water since 2008 (NPC and ICF International, 2014, 
p.12), an estimated 22% of urban dwellers lack access to adequate 
sanitation facilities, and up to 60% depend on shared pit latrines 
(Ademiluyi, 2008, p.179).  
However, these figures vary greatly from state to state, from less than 10% 
access in Zamfara and Ogun states to 67% in Gombe state (NPC and ICF 
International, 2014). A lack of sanitary landfills and waste collection 
services is also common in many cities. These sanitation conditions create 
health hazards, whilst also increasing household burdens, particularly for 
women who tend to take responsibility for healthcare in the household. 
Increased household expenditure can also result from the need to access 
sanitation and health services privately. 
In some national reports (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a), health is 
treated more as a barrier to economic progress than an intrinsic 
component of well-being. The literature indicates general improvements 
nationally in health outcomes such as infant mortality rates, maternal 
health, and HIV/AIDS. Whilst most data available on health does not focus 
specifically on urban health issues, infant and childhood mortality rates 
have been falling year on year since 1999, with rates consistently lower in 
urban than rural areas, and HIV/AIDS prevalence in urban areas is 
estimated to be about double that of rural areas (10.1% and 5.7% 
respectively) (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p. 44). Urban residents 
have access to three times the number of doctors and twice the number of 
nurses and midwives than rural residents (Uneke et al. 2008 in 
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Agunwamba et al 2009:46). However these achievements remain 
problematic especially with regards to gender inequality (Agunwamba, 
2009; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a; Hagen-Zanker & Homes, 2012) 
and urban socio-spatial inequalities, which may impact on substantive 
access within urban populations to such services.   
Nigeria has one of the lowest rates of primary school enrolment in the 
world, with significant gender imbalances in some regions (Agunwamba, 
2009; Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010a). Even though Nigeria is making 
progress with basic primary education enrolment, other studies (Oruwari, 
2006; Uwaifo Oyelere, 2010) show that “returns on education” are falling, 
as school achievement does not guarantee employment. Urban dwellers 
are ostensibly more able to access education than their rural counterparts 
and literacy rates are higher in urban areas than rural areas for children 
(45% vs 19%) (Agunwamba, 2009, p.5), and for women (87% urban, 57% 
rural) (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2013, p.21), although there still exist 
marked discrepancies in school enrolment rates between sexes; gross 
enrolment ratios nationally have been consistently over 10% higher for 
boys than for girls (Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012, p.6).  
The above data provides a snapshot of a number of material and relational 
urban well-being indicators in Nigeria. It is important to note however, 
that whilst there are noticeable differences between rural and urban 
contexts, there exist equally important regional inequalities that impact on 
well-being, due to factors such as sub-national financial autonomy, 
differences in size, population, socio-economic conditions and resources, 
giving rise to variations in poverty and vulnerability between cities located 
in different states. For instance, Hagen-Zanker and Holmes (2012) quote a 
UNDP example of poverty rates in states of Bayelsa and Jigawa as 20% and 
90% respectively. 
Within this context, this report’s exploratory research is based on semi-
structured interviews with key actors in various sectors and cities. The 
report is structured as follows.  
The next section presents the theoretical framework and the methodology 
for the research, including an overview of research participants.  
The findings and analysis section is divided into three main subsections. 
The first outlines the processes, relationships and trends in urban well-
being emerging from the analysis of key stakeholder interviews and from 
supporting secondary literature. The second explores different 
conceptualisations of well-being in Nigeria, as expressed by the categories 
of stakeholder interviewed. The third analyses the processes to achieve 
well-being and is divided into two parts. The first part explores policies and 
interventions to achieve the well-being of citizens, which are either 
implemented by different public authorities, or proposed by research 
participants. The second part looks at ‘people’s practices’ – the ways in 
which citizens individually or collectively pursue their well-being.  
Finally, policy findings and recommendations are outlined before the 
conclusions and implications for future research. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This section is divided in two parts. The first introduces the theoretical 
framework and the second briefly presents the methodology used in this 
research. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The framework through which this research seeks to achieve its aims is 
based on the assumption that different stakeholders build their 
understandings of well-being drawing upon different discourses, and that 
these understandings are deployed to make sense of the urban context, 
and of the processes, relationships and trends that affect well-being.  
On the basis of these understandings, different stakeholders articulate the 
different planned interventions needed to achieve well-being (i.e. a broad 
range of intentional actions to achieve well-being, including changes in the 
legal framework, policies, and development programmes). The research 
also considers advocacy activities to obtain some of these interventions. A 
fourth category relates to the practices that various groups engage with to 
achieve well-being or claim citizenship rights. 
In terms of well-being, this study has adopted White’s (2010) analytical 
framework, which identified three main dimensions explained above. 
Another fundamental element of the White’s framework is how it views 
well-being as the outcome of the interplay between individual and 
collective processes. The approach developed by White understands well-
being not as a state that people experience but as a process, hence the 
objective of this research in people’s practices to achieve well-being.  
In the analysis of well-being, this report also analyses the related concept 
of citizenship, through a similar framework (e.g. urban context; discourses; 
planned interventions).  
“Citizenship is about belonging to a group or community and about 
the rights and responsibilities associated with such membership. In 
addition to being about a status, that confers rights and 
obligations, citizenship is also a practice whereby people are able 
to participate in shaping their societies. It implies not only rights 
and responsibilities, but also interaction and influence within the 
community (Meer & Sever, 2004, p. 12).”  
Therefore, “Citizenship as participation can be seen as representing an 
expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; 
citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents (Lister, 1997, p. 228).”  
Citizenship complements the understanding of well-being in two main 
ways. First, it contributes to identify the relevance of membership to 
different groups for the analysis of well-being and the scale of these 
memberships (local, state, national, etc.). Second, citizenship offers a lens 
to explore who defines the rights to well-being of different social groups. 
In particular, these two aspects of citizenship claims, and how they are 
understood in Nigeria, are further analysed through two dimensions. 
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Figure 2 Aspects of citizenship 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Groups/scales 
This dimension of citizenship relates to the relevant groupings around 
which claims and rights are structured. The analysis of groups may imply 
looking at membership beyond the national level, e.g. Islam, global 
business community, etc. In considering these groupings it is important to 
review the priority given to individual (e.g. market based) or collective 
(e.g. traditional group membership) claims, and how such claims are 
structured around diverse social identities (e.g. gender, ethnicity, class). 
Defining entitlements and priorities 
This dimension of citizenship relates to how claims are made and rights are 
understood. Specifically, are urban citizens considered active social 
subjects who contribute to define their rights and struggle for recognition? 
Or are they seen as passive subjects acquiring legal rights granted by an 
external authority? Secondly are citizenship rights understood in formal or 
substantive terms? And how does this affect well-being? Formal 
citizenship refers to legal rights as opposed to substantive citizenship, the 
de facto realisation of such rights.  
This framing helps to explore whether citizens’ preferences for a desirable 
way of life (religious, sexual preference, etc.) are adequately embodied in 
the set of rights of the political community they belong to.  
“Formal membership without substantive citizenship characterizes 
many of the societies which have experienced recent transitions to 
democracy and market capitalism […] Although in theory full 
access to rights depends on membership, in practice that which 
constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its 
formal status. In other words, formal membership in the nation-
state is increasingly neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for substantive citizenship (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190).” 
Following these considerations it is important to understand which groups 
are salient for what type of citizenship and related aspects of well-being in 
Nigeria. For example, some formal citizenship rights revolve around 
national (Nigerian) citizenship but the actual substantiation of rights is in 
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practice dependent on group membership (e.g. indigeneity) as practised at 
state level. 
While this research acknowledges the complexity of well-being, it mostly 
focuses on two issues as entry points to explore well-being and citizenship: 
infrastructure and services; and insecurity. These have been identified by 
looking at the scope of the wider URN initiative (both future research 
projects in Theme C and projects under the other themes) and at key 
concerns in existing literature. The framework is summarised in the figure 
below. 
 
Figure 3 Visual representation of the theoretical framework 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
A list of key stakeholder types in Nigerian cities was prepared and 
individuals were identified. A total of 45 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted. This research collected the views of policy-makers as well as 
policy implementers, i.e. civil servants at different tiers of government. 
Some 21 participants were working in Government: 6 for Local 
Government (LG); 8 for State Government (SG); and 7 for Federal 
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Government (FG).1 Of these 6 were politicians (PO) either elected (e.g. 
members of state assemblies, LG chairmen) or appointed (e.g. state 
commissioners) and 15 civil servants (CS).  
These were complemented by the views of a range of 19 civil society 
members (CS). Ten of these 19 civil society members were classified under 
the broad umbrella of community (COMM), including religious leaders, 
leaders of ethnic groups, and members of community organisations. Three 
were identified as members of professional organisations (PRO), while 6 
were NGO staff (NGO).  
Finally, 5 participants were from research institutions (Res). 13 participants 
were based in Abuja (A), 23 in Lagos (L), 3 in Zaria (Z), 3 in Kaduna (K), 2 in 
Ibadan (I) and one in Makurdi. Many participants occupied senior positions 
within their organisations (e.g. permanent secretary, executive director, 
director, chairman, traditional king), chosen because their views were 
more likely to have an impact on national discourses and policies. Further 
URN research under the theme of Urban Well-being will consider the 
perspectives of the residents of a low-income neighbourhood. Research 
participants comprised 36 males (M) and 9 females (F), reflecting the 
gender imbalance at the top of selected organisations.2 A table in the 
annex presents an anonymised summary of all research participants. 
Interviews were transcribed and analysed through Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software NVivo 10, which retrieved answers to the same 
questions or on the same topic classified by specific stakeholder 
characteristics, facilitating the identification of patterns. The use of 
software made it easy to compare views and triangulate information. An 
inductive process of analysis revealed emerging patterns and discourses 
amongst interviewees that are presented in the findings section. The 
progressive analysis of interviews revealed that the dataset had reached 
saturation in that additional interviews did not add new substantial issues 
to the analysis, confirming that the findings cover the major discourses on 
the topic in urban Nigeria. 
DATA CHALLENGES AND DEFINITIONS 
This research identifies key issues for urban well-being, and the authors 
have confidence in the quality of the analysis of the findings presented. 
However, the reliability of the quantitative data available on urban areas 
to support the processes and trends identified by key stakeholders has 
limitations. Not only are there discrepancies from different sources, but 
the way rural and urban areas are classified by law and by the National 
                                                          
1 Nigeria is a federal republic made up of 36 states. Each state is divided in a 
number of Local Government Areas (LGAs), currently 774 in Nigeria. 
2 Quotes from interviews are referenced in the text. For example, (8, SG, PO, M, L) 
means that the quote is from Research participant No. 8 (the number allows the 
reader to identify other contribution from the same participants in the text), that 
he is working for the State Government (SG) in a political position (PO), is male 
and from Lagos. (11, FG, CS, F, A) Research participant No. 11 is working as a civil 
servant (CS) for the Federal Government (FG), is Female and based in Abuja. 
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Population Commission (NPC) presents several problems. These challenges 
add to the already complex task of producing such data in the fast-
changing Nigerian urban context. 
There is an overlap of public bodies providing statistics. For example, State 
Governments have their own statistical offices which work independently 
from the National Bureau of Statistics. There are often considerable 
differences and disputes over the statistics provided by the Federal 
Government and State governments, since federal funding allocations to 
states are linked to population.3  
A major challenge in discussing urban Nigeria is the problematic definition 
of an urban area and therefore the difficulties in using existing statistics. 
Definitions are never neutral but in the case of Nigeria they become 
particularly political. Government and research institutions have adopted 
the definition of the National Planning Commission which is based on 
population size and the presence of local government headquarters. 
However, considering that some Local Government Areas (LGAs) were 
established under political influences (since they bring resources and 
employment), they may not be located in what would be considered urban 
according to more standard population criteria. Moreover, most data is 
collected at LGA level but LGAs often cover both urban and rural areas. 
Therefore it is not possible to simply aggregate LGA data to obtain a full 
picture. Furthermore, different levels of government have responsibility 
for land allocation depending on whether an area is declared urban as 
opposed to rural. Governors have the power to declare an area urban4 
which allows them to make planning decisions autonomously from 
traditional leaders and Local Governments. Non-urban areas are allocated 
by Local Governments. Any land one kilometre on both sides of a federal 
highway is also considered urban for planning purposes. As a result of 
these issues, staff at one of the most important federal-funded research 
centres admitted to a lack of reliable data on the population size of cities 
and towns. 
                                                          
3 Statistical conflicts, often linked to fund allocation, appear to be stronger when 
states are ruled by a different political party than the one in power at the Federal 
level. 
4 Section 3 of the 1978 Land Use Act 
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PROCESSES, 
RELATIONSHIPS AND 
TRENDS IN URBAN WELL-
BEING 
The aim of this section is to present a picture of what key stakeholders 
consider to be the factors affecting well-being in Nigerian cities. Of great 
interest are findings that do not relate to single factors but to how key 
stakeholders understand the intersection of multiple factors and their 
relationships, and how these affect urban well-being. 
Three broad trends emerged during discussions about the capacity of the 
Nigerian state to substantively deliver the well-being priorities of citizens, 
as well as in terms of the ability of Nigerian citizens to make claims. These 
relate to rapidly changing demographic and development realities; 
governance issues; and stratified systems of citizenship structured, in 
particular, around indigeneity. 
REALITY OUTPACING PLANNING: RAPID 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
A major commonality that emerged across the majority of stakeholders 
interviewed, particularly civil servants at state and federal levels, is that 
the speed of urbanisation is outpacing the capacity of government 
authorities to plan adequately. The rate of urban population growth is 
such that infrastructure and services development is left lagging and as a 
result, it is becoming more and more difficult for the government to keep 
up with the needs of the urban population (19, Res, F, I).  
Urban planning in a broad sense is considered critical to ensure well-being 
in cities. Its perceived failure in Nigeria was therefore seen as a major 
factor affecting urban well-being. Civil servants raised the issue of working 
in a reactive mode to situations rather than proactively planning ahead.  
Some civil service professionals expressed frustration with constantly 
tackling emergencies rather than working with a consistent long-term plan 
to address their causes. Whilst some planning was perceived as unrealistic 
in the first place, other more realistic plans were felt to be disrupted by 
political interference. Often politicians disregarded professionally-
prepared plans responding to local needs in order to pursue their own 
agendas. These kind of political interferences featured heavily in relation 
to the disruption of planned land use and allocation (27, FG, CS, M, A). 
Other related factors, which are analysed further later in this report, 
regard the difficulties of government actors to view urbanisation as a 
positive phenomenon and their emphasis on the need to halt rural-urban 
migration. Another discourse shared by both civil society members and 
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civil servants concerned the difficulty of implementing existing policies for 
well-being due to a lack of a system of independent monitoring 
implementation, the funding process, and corrupt practices (12, CS, NGO, 
M, K). 
A significant example of the speed of urbanisation and unrealistic plans 
reported by civil servants concerns the plans for the development of the 
new Nigerian capital, Abuja. The development of the city has been planned 
in different phases, with each phase designed for a predicted number of 
inhabitants. At each phase, population predictions significantly 
underestimated reality yet subsequent plans did not take into 
considerations of actual growth. 
GOVERNANCE 
Issues related to poor governance were seen as the main factor affecting 
urban well-being in Nigerian cities. This section explores particular issues 
related to governance as identified by key stakeholders, divided into five 
subsections. 
Power distribution across levels of government 
Political leaders and civil servants working across the three tiers of 
government felt that one process seriously affecting their capacity to 
contribute to citizens’ well-being is the inappropriate level of government 
exercising authority on specific issues. This was attributed to different 
processes. Most responsibilities and powers of each level of government 
are set out in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, and whilst some 
responsibilities appear justified in terms of maintaining national unity in a 
complex country,5 others appear to fulfil the interests of the existing 
political national elite (Helly, 2012). In other cases, through institutional 
practices some levels of government have appropriated powers and 
responsibilities officially belonging to another level of government (NBS, 
2012). The issue is not only vertical (between Local Government, State 
Government, Federal Government) but also horizontal, for instance 
between departments in different ministries.  
In the Nigerian context, relationships between government actors are 
characterised by competition over power and resources, making 
coordination difficult. This was an issue that was clearly highlighted by civil 
servants. These conflicts, particularly between state governments and the 
federal government, often intersect with party politics, and are 
exacerbated where federal and state governments are controlled by 
competing parties.  
Several examples were given which clarify the connection to well-being 
between the governance issues arising from federal and state conflict of 
interests.  
                                                          
5 The Biafra Civil War of secession 1967-1970 has led to a further centralisation to 
promote national unity and prevent powerful governors to challenge the federal 
state.  
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In Nigeria, main roads come under the control of the Federal Government, 
which includes a number of important corridors within the city of Lagos. 
Civil servants gave the example of a five year delay in the implementation 
of a major public transport infrastructure project which required the use of 
a federal road, due to complex political negotiations between the 
Government of Lagos and the Federal Government (which are controlled 
by different political parties). As public transport is a critical sector for 
urban well-being, such delays have had a major impact. Similar delays and 
associated well-being impacts were encountered during plans for a better 
use of the railway system, which is under federal control. 
Another major example highlighted was the lack of state police. Politicians 
at all levels emphasised the need for a state police force. Responsibility for 
the police lies with the federal government and states are prohibited from 
creating their own forces. Governors therefore do not have autonomy to 
develop a strategy to fully tackle the issue of security at the state level.  
However, Lagos state complements its federal allocation for policing with 
additional equipment, training, salaries, and insurance through a private-
public security fund. The demand for state police is a particularly 
controversial issue considering the political competition between the 
administrations of Lagos State and central government, past threats of 
secession in some regions of Nigeria, and the importance of the security 
issue at present. 
Similar issues are experienced in terms of control over electricity. The 
electricity sector is regulated by the Federal Government. Whilst states are 
not allowed to produce and sell electricity to private users, they can 
produce it for the government’s own use. This has led to Lagos 
government achieving a more stable supply for their public buildings, 
including hospitals, and public lighting positively affecting government 
productivity, health services, and security – all important factors for urban 
well-being.  
In addition to conflicts and competition between state and federal 
government levels, many public institutions overlap horizontally, carrying 
out work in parallel and claiming power on the same issues, without 
coordination (13 Res, M, M). One example cited here was the difficulty of 
accessing information on gender-based violence. Interviewees reported 
that different agencies (e.g. the Office of the Public Defender, the Police, 
and the Ministry of Women Affairs) collect their own information but 
coordination between them is very limited. 
One issue that interviewees felt to be connected in multiple ways to well-
being is the concentration of power in the hands of State Governors, and 
their relationships with Local Government Areas. LGAs receive a federal 
funding allocation which is managed through a joint account with the state 
government. However the state government often exercises power over 
the management of these finances, effectively capturing this allocation 
and resulting in a relationship of patronage (UN-Habitat 2012). This 
seriously compromises the financial and political autonomy of LGAs, and 
their capacity to plan and respond to the specific needs of their citizens. 
For example, civil servants working in LGAs in Kaduna State argued that 
such governance arrangements and related bureaucratic practices make it 
very difficult for LGAs to implement their plans (25, LG, CS, M, Z). Political 
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interference, shifting priorities and Governors put pressure on LGA 
chairmen to shift their agendas. Often, Governors take over LGA functions 
in order to build political consensus. One such example is the building of 
access roads; Governors often hold back the LGA allocation in order to 
implement the building of access roads autonomously, despite the law 
mandating local governments to do so. This often means that governors 
build roads strategically to maximise political support rather than 
according to need.  
Additionally, LGA budgets are made yearly at a local level but there is a 
lengthy, bureaucratic process for the budget to be approved and the funds 
released. In Kaduna State for example, most infrastructure projects (e.g. 
boreholes, road construction) cannot be implemented during the rainy 
season. Therefore, due to the delay in approving budgets and releasing 
funds, only some planned projects can be implemented and very often 
these are not the most important/needed (25, LG, CS, M, Z). The NBS, 
UNDP and UN-Habitat report on governance in Nigeria explores how many 
constitutional roles assigned to LGAs are taken over by higher authorities, 
concluding that, while there are huge differences across Nigeria, the denial 
of LGAs autonomy is unconstitutional (NBS, 2012, p. 130). 
The problem of political leadership where power is concentrated in the 
hands of governors and not shared with local government was consistently 
raised, although some questioned the capacity of local authorities to take 
on responsibility, should more power be devolved to them (14, SG, CS, M, 
K). 
Lack of city-level governance 
In relation to the ability of urban citizens to actively pursue claims for their 
well-being priorities, a critical issue is that Nigeria lacks city-level 
governance. No city has a democratically elected city-level government. To 
some extent, the only exception is the city-state of Lagos as the city has 
expanded to cover most of the territory of the state (and actually 
extending beyond the state), effectively rendering the Governor of Lagos 
State an elected mayor of the mega-city. Another exception is Abuja and 
its Federal Capital Territory Administration, which does provide some city 
level governance, but is effectively a ministry of the federal government 
rather than a body that democratically represents the capital’s residents.  
For all other cities, the number of uncoordinated local government bodies 
makes consistent city-level planning difficult, particularly in cities which are 
not state capitals. For example, the city of Ibadan is spread out over five 
LGAs, Kaduna over four (although two also cover areas outside the city) 
and Zaria two. As mentioned previously, these bodies often have limited 
power and report directly to state governors without an intermediary 
authority at city level.  
This lack of unified governance can increase divisions in cities. For 
example, in Kaduna the administrative separation of the city – which 
reflects the religious divide – can make it more difficult to overcome 
sectarian conflicts between Christian and Muslims. Different LGAs may also 
be run by different parties making coordination even more difficult. 
Moreover, the areas covered by local governments also include some rural 
or peri-urban areas, meaning that local government departments must 
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plan rural as well as urban interventions. Small towns generally occupy the 
area of just one LGA; however, LGAs are still weak and lack autonomy from 
state government. 
Capacity in public officers 
Respondents from both the civil service and civil society highlighted a lack 
of capacity and leadership amongst some public sector workers (both 
elected LGA officers and civil servants) as a factor undermining the delivery 
of infrastructure and services needed to enhance the well-being of urban 
residents. Specifically, respondents expressed concern around political 
leaders’ lack of knowledge and awareness of urban processes, resulting in 
inappropriate policies. An exception was made for the Lagos Governor and 
his administration, whose leadership capacities were acknowledged by 
government and professional interviewees. A concern of civil servants and 
researchers was also the dearth of accurate and available data. They 
argued that data is the fundamental starting point to understand existing 
problems and plan solutions. 
It was noted that the way the civil service is structured makes it difficult to 
attract high quality employees. This was exemplified by responses from 
professionals working for externally-funded public agencies who 
constantly emphasised that they were not civil servants and would not 
consider joining the civil service. 
Democracy 
There was unanimous agreement on the importance of 15 years of 
uninterrupted democracy and associated political stability as a 
precondition for enhanced well-being in cities. However, it was also 
recognised that Nigeria’s is still a democracy in transition. It is a country in 
which citizens still fear challenging authority to claim basic rights and 
therefore in which a truly inclusive democracy has not yet been achieved. 
The legacy of the years of military regimes prevails in terms of people not 
claiming some of their rights and accepting some levels of abuse. It was 
argued that confidence in the dividends of democracy and political stability 
has created a conducive environment for investment which led to three 
million tax payers in Lagos.  
Weakness of the state as regulator 
A widely shared perspective was that there are areas in which the 
government is still unable to perform its function as a regulator (and 
enforcer of such regulations) of private sector activities in a way that 
benefits the public and creates conducive competition (31, CS, NGO, M, L). 
This was attributed to a lack of an adequate legal framework but also as 
the result of entrenched institutional practices protecting specific private 
sector interests. 
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STRATIFIED CITIZENSHIP 
Another set of processes affecting well-being relate to how citizenship 
rights are unequally granted. Two specific processes were identified: (i) As 
a basis for citizenship rights, indigeneity linked to the state of origin of a 
citizen (or their parents) is often more important than belonging to the 
Nigerian state; and (ii) socio-spatial inequalities affecting the distribution 
of well-being and ill-being. 
Indigeneity  
Being an indigene or not provides differential access to services and rights. 
Respondents mentioned several times that being in another Nigerian state 
can be worse than being abroad in this respect. This also reflects a 
distinction between formal and substantive citizenship rights as reflected 
in the quotations below:  
“The law says that after five years in another state residents are 
supposed to have the same rights [as indigenes], but the practice is 
very different. It is not even possible to contest as a councillor. It is 
like going abroad (22, Res, M, A).” 
“Nobody has been granted this citizenship or indigeneship in this 
very particular place once you are from outside unlike what 
happens maybe in America [where], after some time, you will be 
now called an American citizen. There is no nobody from outside 
Kaduna State who is not an Hausa man that is an indigene, you are 
not given an indigeneship certificate even though you have stayed 
there for so many years. […] I mentioned one now, the indigene 
certificate, we don’t get the indigene certificate, and that should 
be the beginning because I have stayed here how many years, all 
my children they are still indigenes of Imo State, if you want to do 
something they say go to your own local government area to 
collect it and that is what we have been doing. (21, CS, COMM, M, 
Z).” 
However, it is very difficult to document processes of inequality and 
exclusion based on indigeneity. This is a highly political issue about which 
clear data does not exist (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] surveys are 
based on residence and do not contain data on indigeneity6). Whilst 
Nigerian law and the constitution legislate against discrimination, in 
practice exclusion of non-indigenes varies greatly across states and socio-
economic class. Despite being born in a state, people can be excluded from 
scholarships and other services and told to seek such requests from the 
LGA of their parents’ origin.  
This discrimination also has implications for the capacity of people to run 
for political office. It is important to note that indigeneity is bestowed 
through patrilineal descent and therefore, the children of an indigene 
mother may be excluded from her indigene rights. This idea of not being 
                                                          
6 With the only exception of the census which actually presents other challenges 
with people returning to their state of origins to be counted there. 
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able to become part of the host community is strongly rooted in culture. 
The following Nigerian saying, a version of which can be found in every 
part of the country, illustrates the pervasiveness of this trend: “No matter 
how long the bush cat has stayed in the house, it is not an house cat.” 
Issues of indigeneity become more salient in the context of increasing 
insecurity. Some states have instituted policies of compulsory registration 
for security reasons. This has generated feelings of discrimination in 
people from the north of Nigeria who feel they have been associated with 
the Boko Haram insurgency when in reality they have suffered most from 
the crisis. These policies were recently outlawed by the Federal 
Government. 
The Lagos government has allegedly evicted some Nigerians from the state 
who were considered ‘idle’. A representative of an ethnic minority in Lagos 
expressed his concerns: 
“I don’t buy that idea of sending people back to their own state 
like for instance me, I just told you my family has been here for 
one hundred and fifty years, if you ask me to go back to where I 
am coming from in Jigawa State, where will I start from? I am a 
twelfth generation here in Lagos state now where will I start from? 
You are telling me to go and start from scratch from nowhere. […] I 
don’t believe in sending somebody out from his own country 
because we are all from Nigeria (26, CS, COMM, M, L).” 
Two other types of discriminatory practices against non-indigenes were 
identified. It was argued that areas of the cities with a high presence of 
non-indigenes received a worse provision of public infrastructure. The 
issue of it being a more difficult process to access land for non-indigenes 
was also raised. 
The concerns raised by stakeholders were also presented in an extensive 
report on this issue by Human Rights Watch (2006). The report states that 
policies initially created to protect cultural identity and autonomy have 
been perverted into unacceptable discrimination. For instance, many 
states refuse to employ non-indigenes in their state civil services, and most 
if not all states deny academic scholarships to non-indigenes. Moreover, 
state universities charge higher fees to non-indigenes. This is in addition to 
the barriers to political rights and access to services and infrastructure to 
these communities (Human Rights Watch, 2006).  
“Taken as a whole, these discriminatory policies and practices 
effectively relegate many non-indigenes to the status of second-
class citizens […] Nigeria is home to communities of people who 
are discriminated against as non-indigenes even though their 
families have occupied their land for a century or more and no 
longer have any idea where their ancestors migrated from. A 
Nigerian who cannot prove that he is an indigene of somewhere by 
producing a “certificate of indigeneity” is discriminated against in 
every state of the federation and is barred from many 
opportunities at the federal level as well. […] government policies 
that enhance the importance of Indigeneity have heightened 
intercommunal divisions because they have served to erode the 
very meaning and importance of national citizenship, 
subordinating it in many respects to Nigerians’ ethnicity and 
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ancestry. Indeed, in many important respects state and local 
governments treat their non-indigene constituents like citizens of a 
foreign country. (Human Rights Watch, 2006, pp. 1-2).” 
Urban informality and inequalities 
There is a general trend in the spatial inequality of distribution of well- and 
ill-being. In Lagos, for example, there exists immense socio-spatial 
inequality, with the majority of residents living in informal settlements. 
People living in these areas are subject to massive forced displacement 
and eviction without the provision of alternatives, particularly in Lagos and 
Abuja. Compensation and resettlement policies only cover the few who 
hold titles to land. These processes lead to the destruction of livelihoods. 
To settle in a particular slum location, people make physical, financial and 
psychological investments over a number of years. They also build 
livelihoods around their current living arrangements. Starting from scratch 
all over again due to eviction may dramatically affect their well-being, 
particularly for those already facing other challenges such as debt, poor 
health, and old age. 
In one example given, government officials publicly denied the demolition 
of a settlement claiming that it was a dumping site. Residents had been 
relocated there by the government after the area where they originally 
settled had been cleared to build the national theatre. Despite having been 
relocated there by the government, the government not only proceeded 
with evictions but denied the existence of residents. Human rights 
organisations had to obtain satellite images of the area to demonstrate to 
the government that it had indeed destroyed a settlement, after refusing 
to listen to the protests of residents.  
Another example is within the Municipality of Abuja, where in July 2014, 
761 street vendors were arrested, resulting in the conviction of 674. Not 
only are urban policies designed for the rich but some policies directly 
destroy the livelihoods of the urban poor operating in the informal sector. 
When discrimination on the basis of indigeneity intersects with 
economic/socio-spatial inequality and high levels of chronic poverty in 
Nigeria, these two trends become extremely harmful for the well-being of 
many urban Nigerians. 
WELL-BEING OUTCOMES 
The three trends described above were seen as underpinning factors 
affecting the coordination and equitable delivery of goods and services 
essential for citizens’ well-being. A number of key areas in which such 
goods and services are inadequate to ensure the majority of citizens’ well-
being were raised during interviews. These are described below. 
Electricity  
All interviews emphasised the provision of reliable electricity as a 
fundamental priority to ensure urban well-being, directly and indirectly. It 
was argued that everything depends on power, even the idea of the city 
itself: 
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“…in an urban city, it is not urban if there is no electricity, it is a 
forest if electricity is not functioning at all. Once electricity is poor, 
people have to run a generator at a higher cost. In Nigeria we 
assume that we pay three times higher than what we should be 
paying because of the absence of electricity. For example I paid a 
thousand naira which is about four pounds to have a haircut but if 
there is constant electricity I will pay half of that (42, CS, PRO, M, 
L).” 
The lack of a reliable power supply was highlighted as a particular problem 
for households and businesses. The use of private generators is very costly 
and thus reduces available household income for other expenditures. The 
use of generators is also a serious health hazard: faulty generators can 
cause fatal fires, in addition to severe noise and air pollution from the 
fumes (19, Res, F, I).  
One major impact on well-being caused by the poor electricity supply 
concerns its effects on employment. The lack of reliable electricity affects a 
number of professions: those thought to be most affected included 
carpenters, welders (who rely on quality as well as reliability), barbers and 
shopkeepers. Moreover, the lack of reliable provision of electricity and the 
consequent use of generators substantially increase the costs of products 
and services as well as reducing profit margins.  
At a broader level, impacts such as deindustrialisation, low levels of 
manufacturing employment and output and loss of competitiveness in 
Nigeria were cited. The poor electricity supply was also mentioned as an 
important factor in the closure of textile, aluminium and other industries in 
Kaduna. Moreover, it also affects the productivity of public institutions and 
government offices. Interviewees had positive expectations for the 
upcoming privatisation process and expressed people’s willingness to pay 
more if this meant gaining access to a reliable supply. 
Congestion 
All stakeholders identified traffic congestion as negatively affecting the 
well-being of urban citizens. Congestion is a constant feature of the daily 
life of every inhabitant in Lagos and Abuja, affecting productivity, 
psychological and physical health (e.g. 23, SG, CS, F, L). It was also argued 
that traffic congestion disproportionally affects women with childcare 
responsibilities. Long commutes affect well-being through stress, 
tiredness, lost time and angry feelings: 
“People leave home as early as 4:30am to get to work by 8am, 
they leave their homes by 4:30am and get to work by 7 am and 
sleep in their cars till 8 am, then resume work. That is seriously 
reducing the quality of life and the health of such people are 
affected and so that is another thing I consider as very vulnerable 
to good living (42, CS, PRO, M, L).” 
The concentration of activities in some parts of the city is thought to 
contribute to traffic congestion, particularly as the city continues to grow. 
For example, federal civil servants looked critically at the concentration of 
government ministries and other government agencies in the city centre of 
Abuja, considering it to directly affect congestion. 
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In Lagos, a major cause of congestion, at least in some areas, is the daily 
passage of over 5,000 trucks (as estimated by the Government of Lagos). 
These trucks contribute to air pollution and represent a security risk. Some 
3,000 of these vehicles are tankers transporting oil products refined 
abroad and brought back into the country. The passage of most of these 
trucks could be avoided if Nigeria gets its refineries and pipelines working 
again, as well as putting its existing rail network to effective use. 
Urban well-being is also affected indirectly due to reduced economic 
productivity caused by everyday traffic congestion. This loss of productivity 
was emphasised by every level of stakeholder interviewed, with senior civil 
servants complaining that they are unable to discipline workers for arriving 
late and leaving early, considering the time spent travelling to work. In one 
interview, a policy analyst quoted research revealing that the average 
urban worker in Nigeria loses two hours of productivity each day due to 
traffic: 
“We have discovered that the productive hours of a Nigerian 
urban worker is about four hours in a day because he gets to work 
tired by 8am so basically has to unwind, relax and chill for the 
better part of the morning hours. So productivity actually starts at 
about 11am to 2pm then lunch and after lunch everybody’s mind 
is ‘how do I get home. So productivity again drops by 2pm because 
people have to see how they can beat the traffic by 2:30pm-4pm 
to get home by 6pm. So the actual productive hours of an urban 
Nigerian work are about 4-5 hours daily. In a very productive 
country, productivity is a minimum of 6-7 hours daily. That is two 
hours short in Nigeria (42, NGO, PRO, M, L).” 
Traffic congestion was not only strongly identified as an important issue in 
large cities such as Lagos and Abuja but also in smaller cities such as 
Kaduna, where people interviewed felt the situation was rapidly 
deteriorating. Despite remaining a major issue, stakeholders interviewed 
acknowledged significant recent improvements in the traffic situation in 
Lagos and Ibadan due to major infrastructure interventions. Stakeholders 
recognised ambitious public transport plans in Lagos involving Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT), modern monorails, metrocables and the use of waterways. 
However, concerns remained over the affordability of some of these 
interventions as well as difficulties with implementation and maintenance, 
demonstrated in relation to the BRT (e.g. poor training of bus operators as 
well as the large number of non-operating buses due to poor 
maintenance) (Res, F, L). Future URN research will explore how urban 
mobility and transit policies and practices address equity concerns. 
Housing 
The particular housing context of Nigerian cities impacts greatly on the 
well-being of urban citizens. Large numbers of residents live in inadequate 
shelter due to a housing shortage and to the unaffordability of existing 
housing. Stakeholders interviewed argued that the lack of a well-
functioning mortgage system and very high interest rates make it difficult 
to buy houses, although a mortgage market is developing. Moreover, 
access to land and titling often requires a complex and costly process. One 
of the constraints related to building new homes relates to planning 
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standards which are considered too high to house the existing urban 
population. Another factor contributing to high house prices is that 
wealthy people increasingly use housing to store wealth, particularly due 
to rigid controls on exporting capital.  
Rent prices are high and new tenants are often asked to pay two years rent 
in advance. Thereafter, rent is generally paid in advance on a yearly basis. 
This impacts on the amount of disposable income available to tenants. 
People also tend to live far from their place of work due to issues of 
affordability, with long commuting times affecting their well-being as 
described previously.  
Senior civil servants complained that none of the government programmes 
supposedly providing affordable houses was actually affordable for civil 
servants on middle class incomes. Civil servants in Lagos, Kaduna and 
Abuja expressed that rent levels were affecting their well-being. 
Youth unemployment in cities 
Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, was seen as a major 
factor affecting material and social dimensions of well-being. According to 
most interviewees youth unemployment not only affects the well-being of 
young people but that of society as a whole due to its connection with 
young people engaging in criminal activities in cities. 
Security 
Different types of insecurity severely undermine well-being in urban 
Nigeria. The effects of the insurgency were prominent in all discussions. 
Boko Haram was seen as part of a global phenomenon but interviewees 
acknowledged that Nigeria was less prepared than other countries in how 
to deal with this threat. The spread of the Boko Haram insurgency was 
specifically connected to a lack of basic needs and the failure to deliver 
development in those areas of the country primarily affected.  
As well as being a result of underdevelopment, the insurgency was seen as 
impacting on future development and ultimately on the well-being of 
citizens. The delivery of infrastructure (e.g. road-building) in particular is 
impeded by the presence of the insurgency (14, SG, CS, M, K). It was also 
argued that such insecurity is hindering investment in the affected areas 
(23, LG, CS, M, L). The withdrawal of investment from the north was a 
cause for concern and, in the long-term, could exacerbate the North-South 
divide in terms of development. 
The insurgency was also seen as causing two types of migration. The first 
flow concerns indigene people leaving the epicentre of the insurgency in 
the North-East to escape Boko Haram and state violence (31, Res, NGO, M, 
L). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
estimates that 650,000 have already left their residences. The second flow 
includes non-indigene traders and other business people residing in the 
north of the country, who no longer feel safe and can relocate their 
activities to their state of origin or elsewhere (e.g. Igbo business owners in 
Zaria). Many interviewed in Lagos and Abuja were concerned about the 
further influx of people to these cities. The following quote outlines some 
of the trends resulting from recent insurgency: 
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“There was a time when there was kidnapping, we were 
wondering from where did this kidnapping come, before you know 
it there were assassinations left and right, and this made many 
people leave this place. Now that we have this insurgency, this one 
has almost halted the trend of development in this place. Things 
are no more moving in the right direction, people are no more 
happy. The very people you see here their legs are out, one leg in, 
one leg out, they can even leave any moment from now depending 
on what the political climate will be and what the social climate 
will turn out to be tomorrow. Things are no more as they used to 
be” (21, CS, COMM, M, Z). 
The insurgency has inevitably had a deep impact on people’s psychological 
well-being and in certain cities this has led to changes in behaviour. In 
Abuja, for example, people avoid busy places and people are scared to 
attend religious functions in cities such as Zaria and Kaduna. 
“I think the bigger threat is the insurgency that keeps coming in 
and you never know when they are going to hit. It is now like 
guerrilla war. So it affects the psyche of people. So you start living 
in fear when you are not supposed to. I think these are the 
problems that are becoming an issue. […] It’s just that you will 
start getting afraid, you won’t want to go where there is a crowd 
so your earlier relaxation to be within and socialise as you should 
has gone. Maybe we will now go back to Facebook and start doing 
it through Facebook (45, CS, PRO, M, A).” 
Institutions such as schools have also been affected: in Abuja some schools 
ended the school term early after exams, schools are being fenced off, civil 
defence presence in schools is being negotiated, and graduation 
ceremonies suspended (36, FG,CS, F, A). 
Insecurity is also held to have accelerated the construction of gated 
communities. Whilst this trend had already started before the last wave of 
insurgency, processes of ‘privatisation of security’ have found a new 
legitimacy. The creation of vigilante groups is another trend (e.g. 19, Res, 
F, I). Such groups are also used to support political candidates and enforce 
extra-judicial justice: 
“what you have is an increase in the proliferation of para-security 
organisations like the vigilantes for certain communities just to 
provide extra security […] Security has always been a top issue for 
Nigeria especially for urban cities. But now terrorism has added a 
different dimension to that because they are not something that 
the police force can protect you from. We are living at the threat 
of each other, the fear that someone coming randomly without 
proper checks can be a threat (42, CS, PRO, M, L).” 
An important point raised was how police and army brutality increases 
insecurity. State security institutions often violate the rights of people and 
citizens feel they cannot trust any institutions (34, SG, CS, F, L). Traditional 
rulers avoid turning to the police and prefer to solve problems locally: 
“These expressions of the security problem proceed in tandem 
with pronounced weaknesses in the functioning of security 
agencies, especially the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) […] to the extent 
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that the presence of the police itself sometimes inspires insecurity 
(NISER, 2005, p. 1).” 
The link between food security and state security was also emphasised, 
particularly by politicians (33, SG,CS, M, L). Failure to ensure food security 
in cities can lead to social unrest, undermining state security and political 
stability. A politician mentioned the protest related to food prices in 
Tunisia which initiated the Arab Spring and drew parallels with the protests 
that took place in Nigeria when the government attempted to remove fuel 
subsidies which people felt had an enormous impact on transport and food 
prices (17, SG, PO, M, L). An inefficient food distribution system, road 
networks affected by flooding, and fluctuations in fuel prices have also 
been identified as factors affecting food prices.  
Finally, it was argued that the prominence of the issue of security in the 
public discourse is used to conceal other concerns and prevent the voicing 
of strong criticisms on other issues important to well-being such as budget 
monitoring on health and education. 
Health 
People interviewed agreed on a general trend of improved health in many 
cities, partly as a result of improved public health provision.  Interviewees 
reported that these improvements were connected to commitments made 
under the Millennium Development Goals which were achieved with the 
contribution of global donors. For instance, the Global Fund has 
substantially increased its support to the country over the past four years, 
and has heavily subsidised malaria drugs. 
Another important relationship raised by participants was that between 
infrastructure and health. In particular, a number of stakeholders 
emphasised the role of good drainage to improve health in cities. 
However, general trends for specific cities are difficult to identify as 
evidence provided by participants was often anecdotal. 
CONCLUSION 
This section identified three major trends affecting well-being and 
described processes affecting well-being outcomes in cities in six key areas. 
While predominantly referring to the material dimensions, the processes 
described also emphasised relational aspects around inequalities and 
psychological well-being as well as the importance of the subjective 
dimension. The next section will look at how, based on their understanding 
of the urban processes in Nigeria, key stakeholders conceptualise well-
being. 
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CONCEPTUALISATION 
Drawing on the discussions above, this section analyses how different 
stakeholders conceptualise well-being. This analysis contributes to 
understanding how stakeholders interpret the factors that undermine 
urban well-being outlined in the previous sections and prepares for the 
analysis of policies and interventions that are in place – as well as people’s 
practices to achieve well-being. 
WELL-BEING IN KEY POLICY DOCUMENTS 
A first step is to understand how well-being is conceptualised in Nigeria’s 
key policy documents. As these simply provide a starting point for an 
analysis of stakeholders’ conceptualisations, the report briefly looks at 
three documents: (1) Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (2010b) which presents the 
country’s goals and strategies to achieve them; (2) the National Urban 
Development Policy (2012), the overarching policy for urban Nigeria which 
focuses on the specific context of this research; and (3) the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) (2004), the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for Nigeria.  
Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (NV20:2020) is “Nigeria’s long term development 
goal designed to propel the country to the league of the top 20 economies 
of the world by 2020” (p. 2). In this document, “guaranteeing the well-
being and productivity of the people” is one of the three pillars 
underpinning this vision. The vision identifies a set of problems preventing 
the achievement of well-being: “The main goal of Nigeria’s Vision 20:2020 
is to improve the well-being of Nigerians. In this direction, the Vision aims 
to reduce the problems of hunger, poverty, poor healthcare, inadequate 
housing, low quality human capital, gender imbalance, low productivity 
and poor basic facilities by 2020” (p. 8). Well-being is seen as something to 
improve by reducing a set of problems. NV20:2020 is based on a discourse 
on the achievement of well-being through translating economic growth 
into “equitable social development for all citizens” (p. 2). Beyond access to 
a basic set of services, two key interventions are presented to allow people 
to achieve their ‘productivity’ and ‘well-being’, which are closely 
associated in the vision. These are building human capital, and improving 
access to credit (through micro-credit). The discourse presented in the 
vision does not mention structural inequalities and relationships that need 
to change. 
The conceptualisation of well-being emerging from NV20:2020 therefore 
almost exclusively focuses on the material aspects of well-being with two 
notable exceptions in the area of relational well-being. The vision aims to 
“promote gender equality and empower women” and “foster a culture of 
recreation and entertainment for enhanced productivity.” However, these 
two aspects appear to be framed as instrumental to the achievement of 
material well-being. Moreover, from the framing of the pillar, well-being 
itself seems to be instrumental to productivity. It is useful to present here 
the objectives given in the vision to guarantee well-being and productivity 
of citizens (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2010, pp. 8-10): 
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■ Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty 
■ Guarantee food security  
■ Enhance access to quality/affordable healthcare 
■ Provide sustainable access to potable water and basic sanitation 
■ Provide accessible and affordable housing 
■ Build human capacity for sustainable livelihoods and national 
development 
– Developing human capital 
– Acquiring education and skills 
– Generating employment and protecting jobs 
– Empowering persons with disability  
■ Improve access to micro-credit 
■ Promote gender equality and empower women 
■ Foster a culture of recreation and entertainment for enhanced 
productivity. 
Well-being is also part of the goal of the National Urban Development 
Policy, which aims to  
“promote a dynamic system of urban settlements, which fosters 
sustainable economic growth, promotes efficient urban and 
regional planning and development, as well as ensures an 
improved standard of living and well-being of all Nigerians (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 2012, p. 14).” 
However, well-being is only explicitly mentioned once within the rest of 
the policy, where it is included in one of the objectives under a goal related 
to poverty reduction and social welfare: “…to enhance the capacity of 
urban authorities to improve the living conditions as well as the general 
economic well-being of the citizenry to have access to social welfare 
facilities” (p. 30). This objective clarifies that reference to “economic well-
being” refers exclusively to the material dimension. 
The NEEDS is older than the other documents but still significant as it 
represents the country’s commitment to external donors and presents 
Nigeria’s strategy to address poverty. In the report’s opening line, the 
document is described as “Nigeria’s plan for prosperity” (2004, p. viii). The 
report clarifies that:  
“A primary aim of NEEDS is to create a new Nigerian citizen who 
values hard work and who realizes that one cannot have 
something for nothing. Achieving this aim may be the strongest 
action Nigeria can take to build a better future for its people 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, p. viii).“ 
In the chapter titled Investing in the Nigerian People it is argued that 
“NEEDS is about the Nigerian people—their health, education, 
employment, happiness, sense of fulfilment, and general well-being” 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, p. 28). Well-being is also mentioned in 
the chapter Creating a Competitive Private Sector, in a section on 
environmental management which reads: “NEEDS focuses on ensuring a 
safe and healthful environment that secures the economic and social well-
being of Nigerians on a sustainable basis” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
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2004, p. 65). While there is no further elaboration of what is specifically 
meant by ‘well-being’, it shows an awareness that well-being has a social 
as well as an economic dimension. However, these references are limited 
in the document and found in chapters focusing on investment and private 
sector growth. 
STAKEHOLDERS’ UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
WELL-BEING 
Well-being as basic needs 
The prevailing conceptualisation amongst stakeholders is that well-being is 
defined as the fulfilment of a set of basic needs. Employment (including 
self-employment) is seen as key to generating the income needed to meet 
such basic needs. The main strategy here is to pursue economic growth 
and the creation of jobs primarily through the development of the private 
sector. In this context, the role of the state therefore is to create an 
enabling environment for investment. This is based on a citizenship model 
based on ‘regimes of activation’ in which the creation of employment is 
considered sufficient for citizens to achieve well-being. This vision can be 
at odds with policies of other countries facing high rates of economic 
growth as well as a significant number of people living in poverty. The 
Indian government issues a ration card which provides a range of social 
security benefits, for example, while in Latin America a number of 
countries have introduced conditional cash transfers and other social 
security programmes. 
Stakeholders emphasised three key, interrelated basic needs to achieve 
urban well-being: food, transport, and housing.7 Employment was also 
considered by some as a basic need needed to fulfil the others. In terms of 
food, government stakeholders placed emphasis on the importance of 
good quality, nutritious food, with particular reference to child nutrition 
and impacts on cognitive development and future opportunities:  
“If you don’t have a job you cannot live well, because we do not 
have a social safety net. Most of the social safety net we have is 
still very, very minuscule. So we, government, must find a way of 
reducing youth unemployment, stabilising the fuel prices, reducing 
the volatility of food prices. So to me when a man tells you he is 
living well or his well-being is very, very okay he means he is 
having good food, his food security is guaranteed, means of 
transportation is ensured, and he has a job. He is either in paid 
employment or an entrepreneur (17, SG, PO, M, L).” 
Framing well-being in terms of a set of basic needs was also thought to be 
useful in terms of the subjective nature of preferences and aspirations. 
Civil servants felt this subjectivity to be problematic for government 
                                                          
7 Other presented a more comprehensive list of the essential for urban well-being 
that were lacking in Nigerian cities. The list included: roads, effective public 
transport systems, housing, electricity, safe potable water, as well as services like 
education and medical care. 
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planning, arguing that with a growing income the aspirations and scales of 
preference of individuals may expand and change. Moreover, well-being is 
“ambiguous” because “each person has their own priorities” (6, FG, CS, M, 
A). Government policy and planning cannot therefore keep up with 
people’s expanding preferences and therefore should focus on a standard 
set of basic needs, achievable for all. 
“What you want may not be what she wants. We have individual 
differences. But the baseline: roof over your head; good health; 
that you can commute from one place to another; that you can do 
your business with certain inputs from government like power 
supply for instance; security; water supply—all those things that 
are the inputs that make a good life (7, FG, CS, M, A).” 
Well-being as a means to achieve productivity and growth 
Responses around the perceived importance of well-being for urban 
citizens were often connected to the productivity and thus economic 
growth and development of Nigeria with little or no mention of well-being 
in terms of rights. The only mention of well-being as a right by government 
stakeholders was phrased in terms of people having “a right to actually 
participate in some kind of economic activities” (15, SG, CS, M, L). Another 
example was the view taken by some stakeholders that interventions to 
improve citizen health were a way to maintain citizen productivity. From a 
civil service perspective, maintaining productivity through well-being was 
also important for taxation (e.g. 14 SG, CS, M, K). 
The general understanding amongst stakeholders was that well-being is 
multi-dimensional. However, the dimensions most consistently identified 
and often articulated in terms of basic needs were connected with what 
White (2010) would consider the material dimension. Overall, the 
conceptualisation of well-being and how it can be achieved that emerges 
from key Nigerian stakeholders is consistent with New Institutional 
Economics8 which emphasises the role of the state in providing an 
enabling environment for the private sector to flourish. 
Well-being as security 
An alternative but consistent conceptualisation of well-being presented by 
stakeholders was well-being as security. In this instance, security was 
understood as a holistic term encompassing several processes. For 
instance, a participant indicated that well-being for urban citizens “would 
be in terms of security within the city […] security from crime, security 
from disasters both natural and made disasters. Good living will also be in 
terms of food security, the economic well-being and secure livelihood” (19, 
Res, F, I). This conceptualisation was very important in relation to the point 
often made that insecurity and uncertainty are a constant condition of 
urban life in Nigeria that undermines well-being, particularly psychological 
well-being.  
                                                          
8 This refers to the current agenda often framed as the post-Washington 
consensus, which builds on New Institutional Economics, recognising that to work 
effectively, the state has to provide an enabling framework.  
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While different dimensions of insecurity and uncertainty were mentioned, 
the issue of physical security linked to crime, violence and particularly the 
insurgency (including the many terrorist attacks on civilians) figured 
prominently in this conceptualisation. The impacts on everyday behaviour 
were emphasised; “If you don’t feel secure you are bound to stay indoors 
and you might not explore the opportunities that are there for you” (29, 
CS, NGO, F, L). In areas that had been affected by intercommunal violence 
based on religion, security framed as peace was considered the 
precondition to enjoy any other dimension of well-being: “even if you have 
the food and there is no peace, you can’t have rest of mind. Even though 
you have that good road, without peace you will not enjoy the road […] If 
you have security, you have everything (30, CS, COMM, M, K).” 
In this context, another interesting aspect of looking at security as well-
being was the expressed need for youth employment generation policies 
in order to contain the perceived security threat posed by unemployed 
young people. An endlessly repeated expression across interviewees in all 
cities was that “an idle mind is the devil’s workshop.” 
Well-being as a defining feature of the city 
For some stakeholders, well-being was considered as a defining feature of 
the city, arguing that a city that does not deliver well-being to its residents 
fails to be a city. Also in the imaginary of rural dwellers the city is the place 
of well-being.  
Well-being as social order 
The idea of well-being as social order was prevalent amongst civil servants 
at State and Federal levels. The argument put forward (further explored 
later in the report) is that well-being is the product of following policies, 
masterplans, and planning standards. It is when plans are not followed 
(e.g. due to political interference or due to incapacity to cope with rates of 
urban growth), that ‘disorder’ and ‘chaos’ lead to poor well-being of urban 
residents. For this reason, well-being was thought to be easily achievable 
as long as there was the political will to ‘stick to the masterplan’. Following 
the same reasoning, a strong association was made between disorder and 
informality, explicitly emphasising the importance of converting the 
informal into the formal. This discourse around social order also often 
encompassed a particularly aesthetic view of well-being, to be achieved 
through the orderly implementation of plans and strongly associated with 
beautification and greening interventions:  
“There wasn’t a deliberate process of planning, the cities are 
expanding organically so they grow naturally out of the expansion 
of businesses and population. There was not a deliberate plan by 
the government to expand certain areas and so proper 
infrastructure was not put in place to cater for this growth. A 
major issue for me is that this will lead to disorder and we need 
order. To plan and to put things in order, you will damage a lot of 
things especially houses because you have to displace people to 
properly map out places for residence, businesses or industry. So 
the major issue for me is the disorder in urban cities, so lack of 
planning is the key thing that causes this disorder (42, CS, PRO, M, 
L).” 
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ACHIEVING WELL-BEING 
This section presents the processes taking in place in urban Nigeria to 
achieve well-being as identified by stakeholders. The first part analyses 
government policies and interventions to achieve well-being, while the 
second explores citizenship practices. 
POLICIES AND INTERVENTIONS 
Stakeholders’ views on policies for urban well-being are strongly linked to 
their understanding of the relevant urban processes and their 
conceptualisations of well-being. Three characteristics of policy have been 
identified: (1) a focus on social order; (2) the prominence of middle class 
concerns and exclusion of poor and non-indigenes; (3) the view of the 
government as enabler of (economic) development. These are followed by 
examples of policy concerns in which these characteristics play out. 
Restoring ‘social order’: planning for whom? 
A view shared amongst government stakeholders was that policies and 
planning for ‘social order’ are required in order to achieve well-being. This 
view presents a strong modernist discourse combining criteria based on 
aesthetics and ‘order.’ Planning was viewed in terms of restoring a social 
order lost during the rapid growth of cities: 
“If there are no plans, the city won’t be orderly. Planning is about 
ensuring orderliness, cleanliness and maximizing the land 
resources to achieve better living (40, SG, CS, M, L).”  
“I would work on the policy of social order, where we will come up 
with creative ways of ensuring public order such as: you cannot 
sell things on certain part of the road; everywhere cannot be a bus 
stop; you cannot build your houses anywhere you feel you want to 
build it—those things that lead to general order in the society (42, 
CS, PRO, M, L).” 
These ideas were entrenched within high levels of the civil service, 
amongst those holding political positions as well as planning professionals. 
One suggested method of achieving social order was to follow the existing 
masterplan and planning and building regulations. This technocratic 
discourse emphasises that planning is an exclusively technical and neutral 
process that professionals have to do for people, rather than with people: 
“In this office we’re professional. We’re planning for people” (2, FG, CS, M, 
A).  
Two other policy areas related to social order were raised, revealing 
interesting findings around who cities are understood to be planned for. 
The first regards the emphasis on the greening of the city, while the 
second addresses policies towards those living in informal settlements. 
A strong emphasis in Lagos revolved around the importance of greening 
demonstrated by the following interview excerpts: 
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“Greening, I mean the tree planting and the greening is a serious 
prerequisite for preventive medicine. The parks and gardens allow 
for a good, relaxed atmosphere and a beautiful aesthetic, I mean 
texture of the area, all these are very impactful on the people (10, 
SG, PO, M, L).” 
“Health starts from cleanliness... That’s why the Lagos state 
government in partnership with local government will say “we 
have to plant trees” every time. So when we plant trees it helps us 
in our daily activities (20, LG, PO, F, L).” 
Along with this discourse of greening, cleanliness and order, a certain 
attitude towards informal settlements clearly emerged built on an implicit 
association between low-income people and disorder. Slums and their 
residents were seen as a source of criminality and moral vice to be 
eradicated rather than engaged with:  
“Slums breed criminality. Crime rages in so much of the slum 
areas. The more you attempt to reduce the incidence of slums, the 
more you are reducing the incidence of crime. Prostitution and all 
other social moral vices do well in the slum areas (10, SG, PO, M, 
L).” 
With increased security concerns in Nigeria, discourses of social order and 
public order were seen as interrelated priorities. The understanding that 
the primary responsibility of government is to provide for the security of 
property and human life, and the centrality of security for enabling foreign 
and national investment contributed to translate security concerns into 
various policies. Several stakeholders emphasised the need to introduce 
wide-scale use of CCTV for security. This demonstrates the use of western 
models of security which do not necessarily take into consideration the 
priorities of the majority of residents in informal settlements. 
Conversations on planning standards captured an often perhaps 
unrealistic understanding of the situation of the majority of the urban 
residents. For example, a professional and former civil servant argued that 
Nigerians need bigger housing compared to western standards due to 
cultural differences, rather than considering how planning standards and 
regulations might need to adapt to increasing urban concentrations in 
order to facilitate access to housing: 
“[The] standards we allow for permits, you know when you do 
building design, when you do planning permit, the standards, are 
they reflecting […] the culture that we have because of the 
weather and the kind of people we have, you know there has to be 
a courtyard where the family sits away from where the public 
meets the family—unlike [the houses] where you come into the 
sitting room straight and there is everybody sitting, the children, 
everybody, visitors. In some of our cultures, women will stay 
separate and the children, then the father and his visitors. So again 
you have to give room for such interaction, and then there has to 
be a common space for the family to interact just on their own. 
The white man’s interaction space is usually his dining table. Unlike 
us, we, men will hardly go to the kitchen. But for them, the 
kitchen, the sitting room the dining area is in the same zone. But 
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for us here there is that variation. So yes, is one way of doing that, 
the standard needs to be checked (45, CS, PRO, M, A).” 
This and other considerations emphasise how most planning is aimed at 
the middle and upper classes rather than the large majority of urban 
residents of lower incomes. For instance, in Lagos, several stakeholders 
had the vision of building the model of an African mega-city. This drew 
upon projects such as that of Atlantic City, i.e. building an ideal city for the 
upper class through reclaiming land from the sea.  
One researcher expressed her critical stance towards this proposed model: 
“Unfortunately the African model mega-city is built around 
indicators for the western world that are attractive to foreign 
investors and so a lot of their policies and program are very elite. 
And if you have a city where you have about 60 percent living on 
less than a dollar a day and you have an elite, the philosophy 
behind your government is an elite government […] inherently you 
are just providing for the few who do not belong to the low 
income (43, Res, F, L)” 
These views on policies and planning for social order can translate into 
specific interventions requiring the formalisation of informal practices and 
processes including the explicit elimination or renewal of slums, which are 
considered a source of insecurity. These views chime with the reality of a 
number of mass evictions, demolitions and street clearances currently 
taking place in Nigerian cities without consideration for the lives and 
livelihoods of residents. As mentioned above, in July 2014, Abuja’s 
administration arrested hundreds of street hawkers, prosecuting and 
convicting 674 of them, in addition to arresting 172 beggars and destitute 
as well as 72 minors.9 The deportation of non-indigenes to their state of 
origin due to their ‘idleness’, particularly implemented by Lagos State, is 
also related to this idea of social order. 
Evictions and relocations 
The prominence of the idea of ‘social order’ and the resulting attitudes 
towards informal settlements have led to a certain legitimisation of 
government actions to relocate people living in informal areas without 
engagement, in contrast to other countries where civil society 
organisations play an important role in negotiations around relocation. 
Research participants from civil society pointed out how large-scale 
evictions have particularly affected the livelihoods of thousands of 
dwellers. A strong critical argument was made that urban policies are not 
only designed for the wealthy but that they directly destroy the livelihoods 
of the urban poor. 
Compensation and resettlement policies only apply to a minority of those 
evicted, i.e. those in possession of land titles. Civil servants strongly felt 
that those without land titles should not be able to claim compensation: “if 
you have lived for 50 years but have no documents you have illegally 
                                                          
9 Daily Post (26/08/2014), FCTA arrested 761 street traders, 172 beggars in July 
http://dailypost.ng/2014/08/26/fcta-arrested-761-street-traders-172-beggars-
july-minister/ 
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occupied my [government] property, why should you get compensation?” 
(27, FG, CS, M, A). They also pointed out that indigenous communities as 
well as those with titles do get properly compensated. One NGO 
representative strongly argued that the way the government uses the 1978 
Land Act and the Certificate of Occupancy is “antithetical to the law” 
because “the act was made to recognise the pre-existing situation [i.e. the 
situation before 1978], not to destroy the claims of all those who do not 
have titles’ (41, CS, NGO, M, L).  
Who are policies for? 
Another characteristic of policy linked to this idea of social order relates to 
who the targets of such policies are. This section analyses urban policies 
for well-being in relation to people living in poverty and non-indigenes. 
Policies for urban well-being are not for the poor 
A point that emerged from the multiple discussions is that policy 
interventions for well-being in cities are not focused on the needs and 
aspirations of the poor. Strong criticisms of current planning practices and 
policies were raised by some researchers and NGO members. For example:  
“Urban planning and planners typically operate from a very 
technical, professional point of view. They are not really in the 
process of putting the people first, putting their views as a priority 
while designing or managing our cities, that is the last thing on 
their minds. They are more interested in physical aspects of cities, 
they are more interested in some form of compliance with codes 
in the urban, whether it is building codes, spatial codes. In short, 
regulation of the usage of the city […] is very technical and that’s 
where the problem is because you find out that both the designers 
and managers of the cities don’t really factor into account the 
views of the people (41, CS, NGO, M, L).” 
“We have focused on good roads, but how many people have 
cars? […] Now there are subsidies on petrol. But these don’t 
benefit everyone. There is discussion about deleting them and 
using those funds for infrastructure. I would prefer to see these 
funds used to subsidise food (22, Res, M, A).” 
Some pro-poor interventions are proposed not because of their potential 
to improve the lives of the poor, but rather because they are cost-
effective. It was argued that some interventions which could improve the 
well-being of the urban poor could have economic returns, for example it 
would be cheaper to treat dirty water rather than any subsequent water-
related diseases. 
What emerges very clearly from the policies for urban well-being 
suggested by interviewed stakeholders is that the concerns of people living 
in poverty – the majority of urban dwellers – are largely overlooked. 
Citizenship and indigeneity 
A key process affecting the well-being of urban Nigerian is the exclusion of 
non-indigenes from accessing some public services and from running for 
elective offices (Section 4.1). This process is translated into different 
discourses about citizenship by different actors. A recent study (Alemika, 
Cheeseman, & LeBas, 2012) suggested that the attitudes of urban citizens 
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towards the exclusion of non-indigenes differ. While most urban citizens 
think that discrimination in terms of access to services is not justified and 
everyone should be entitled to equal state services, the large majority are 
in favour of the exclusion of non-indigenes from elective offices.  
However, there are differences depending on the city. For instance, Aba, 
Ibadan and Lagos were more favourable to non-indigenes running for 
elective positions. Similarly, the work of Abah and Okwori (2005) 
demonstrates the contradictions in attitudes towards citizenship of non-
indigenes and the discourses around this issue at local level. The 
majoritarian discourse supporting granting non-indigenes equal access to 
services should lead the Nigerian government to pass a non-discriminatory 
law that can protect the constitutional provision to secure ‘full residence 
rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation.’ 
As objects of policy people in urban Nigeria are not treated equally. Often 
people living in poverty are not seen as policy targets and this approach 
does not seem to be strongly contested. On the other hand, there are a 
number of policies and practices which exclude non-indigenes but these 
seems to be increasingly challenged.  
Government as a provider of enabling environment and 
infrastructure and services 
Consistent with the conceptualisation of well-being presented so far, a 
third characteristic of policy is built around the view that government 
responsibility lies in providing the enabling environment for private 
activities that ultimately lead to well-being. According to stakeholders, 
government is not in the position to directly employ or provide basic needs 
for every citizen. However, government should create the enabling 
environment for people to achieve their well-being.  
An important component of this environment is the provision of certain 
public goods, particularly infrastructure and services, that individuals, no 
matter how rich, cannot provide for themselves. Most stakeholders 
recognised that much infrastructure requires government provision or at 
least government regulation, and that no single actor can effectively 
provide certain types of infrastructure. These included good road 
networks, electricity, water supply, and public transportation.  
Infrastructure was also closely linked to policies for well-being due to the 
close relationship made between well-being and productivity and the view 
that infrastructure is necessary for productivity. Public lighting was also 
mentioned as an infrastructure intervention effective in the reduction of 
crime and improvement of livelihoods through extending the business 
hours of small and medium enterprises with a multiplier effect on the local 
economy. Another component of the enabling environment highlighted is 
the importance of facilitating the development of the manufacturing 
sector by harmonising taxation between tiers of government.  
POLICY CONCERNS 
These three policy characteristics are now explored in the analysis of a 
number of policy concerns identified by stakeholders.  
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Decongestion policies 
Consistent with the identification of congestion as a major factor 
undermining urban well-being (section 4.1), government stakeholders 
emphasised the importance of policies to ‘decongest’ the city.  
This discourse around decongestion is also associated with the 
unwillingness to accept urbanisation and view it as a positive 
phenomenon. This was confirmed by a number of senior government 
officials insisting that it was important to develop and invest in rural areas 
to stop rural-urban migration. This migration was considered as an 
important cause of city congestion which makes it difficult to provide 
infrastructure and services (19, Res, F, I; 7 FG, CS, M, A). The political 
discourse around stopping this migration flow was strong despite evidence 
pointing to the prominent role of natural growth in explaining most 
population growth in Sub-Saharan cities (UN-Habitat, 2006).  
Underpinning this view, there is a negative perception of urbanisation and 
the idea that urbanisation can be controlled and stopped. “You plan the 
rural areas, you keep the people there happy or comfortable so that it will 
help you to control the urban growth in the urban areas” (14, SG, CS, M, 
K). The related idea is that urban well-being can be achieved with policies 
targeting rural areas so as to prevent further migration. 
A frequent proposal to decongest cities referred to the decentralisation of 
centres of activities through the creation of polycentric cities to avoid high 
levels of daily commuting to the city centre. The main strategy 
underpinning this policy was the provision of services and employment 
where people live. 
In Lagos, the transport masterplan was built upon a major idea of 
developing twenty centres of activities by bringing in services and good 
transport connections. The aim was the relocation of some top jobs to 
incentivise regional development and partner up with neighbouring states 
(15, SG, CS, M, L). In Abuja, the focus of the decentralisation process was 
the creation of new satellite towns ‘to make people productive where they 
are’ (4 FG, CS, M, A). In Abuja, many emphasised the improvement of 
security as a result of decongestion since terrorist attacks tend to target 
congested places.  
Transport and road infrastructure 
Providing transport both in terms of the road infrastructure and the 
availability of road services was considered of the utmost importance: 
“Transport is like this vein. It takes blood from the heart transports it to 
others […] supplies the entire body. Anywhere there is an access road you 
open up new possibilities” (14, SG, CS, M, K).  
However, from the interviews the different priorities of middle class civil 
servants, civil society members and researchers with a concern for low-
income groups clearly emerged. For instance, interventions to improve the 
traffic situation did not take sufficient account of loss of livelihoods and 
changes in price and availability of services. The ban of commercial 
motorbikes for urban transport was a very controversial policy. Carrying 
passengers on motorbikes in certain areas of Lagos and in cities such as 
Zaria was banned on security and health grounds arguing that motorbikes 
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were used for criminal activities and commercial motorbike drivers caused 
too many accidents. Therefore, a number of civil servants and politicians 
argued that this was a good policy for well-being. However, such a policy 
raised serious concerns amongst community leaders and researchers due 
to the enormous loss of jobs for young people and to the lack of cheap 
transport alternatives for many Nigerians. It was argued that commercial 
motorbikes run by young people had been incentivised and promoted by 
the same authorities which recently banned them. Moreover, the concern 
that a high number of young people would find themselves without a 
source of livelihood, it was argued, represented an even higher security 
threat than the use of commercial motorcycles. 
Social security mechanisms for unemployed youth 
Several stakeholders argued that an important issue was the lack of basic 
social protection and that there was a need for social security mechanisms 
for unemployed young people. However, considering unemployment and 
poverty rates, stakeholders acknowledged that such interventions are 
unrealistic. Policies to generate employment such as choosing labour 
intensive technology for public works and services were considered more 
realistic. It is important to note that the concern for youth unemployment 
was related to the security risk posed by young people rather than a 
concern for the well-being of unemployed youth. An interviewee 
summarised social protection interventions in this way: “A fixed token that 
would reduce thuggery, theft, political hooliganisms (22, Res, M, A).” 
Education and vocational training 
Public policies in the education and training sector were considered of the 
utmost importance. However, there were several concerns about the 
progress achieved in terms of the quality of public education. There was 
praise for public interventions such as skill acquisition centres that would 
prepare young people for a profession. However, concerns were raised on 
the relevance of the careers proposed which did not adapt to the changes 
in consumers’ demands. 
Food security  
Food security was mentioned as important by a number of government 
research participants in political positions as well as civil servants. While 
this is an important area for the well-being of urban citizens living in 
poverty, the discourse was often framed in terms of national security 
emphasising the importance of food security to avoid riots. Controlling 
price fluctuations of fuel and creating an efficient food distribution system 
were considered important interventions. Lagos State has embarked on a 
policy to incentivise food production which they also considered important 
in terms of employment generation of such strategy. 
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CITIZENSHIP PRACTICES 
The function of the state as enabler of well-being in urban Nigeria is poorly 
performed, largely because of the three trends presented above. As a 
result, citizens engage in collective practices, exercising active citizenship 
to achieve well-being. It is important to note that the main objective of this 
active citizenship is the delivery of good and services to members rather 
than claiming rights. This section presents some of the citizenship practices 
adopted by individuals, households, and communities to achieve well-
being as identified by key stakeholders interviewed.  
Diverse groups of urban citizens necessarily have different well-being 
priorities. The main dimension that generates different priorities and 
attitudes towards policies with regards to well-being is social class in terms 
of income level. As an example, the banning of commercial motorbikes 
(see above) was well received amongst wealthy car users but was 
perceived as a loss of livelihood and as a cheap means of transport by low-
income groups. In terms of different priorities, a civil servant argued that 
low-income groups seek access to free services and infrastructure while 
the upper class is willing to pay but demand services of good quality (14, 
SG, CS, M, K). 
The relationship between government and citizens is a significant 
determinant of people’s own practices to achieve well-being. The social 
contract offered by politicians to citizens during political campaigns is 
based on the idea that once in power they will provide for every citizen’s 
need. The citizen is positioned as a recipient of state provision, generating 
frustration when expectations are unmet. When public provision does fail, 
services (such as electricity, security, road repairs, financial services) are 
either obtained privately, or through a number of different collective 
action processes. According to stakeholders, urban citizens feel that the 
provision of certain public goods would be better provided by (e.g. 
security), or at least regulated by (e.g. electricity) the state but are obliged 
to seek them elsewhere. The citizenship practices analysed below present 
a range of collective action at various scales. 
Community Development Associations 
The importance of Community Development Associations (CDAs)10 was 
consistently highlighted during discussions with key stakeholders as a 
practice to achieve well-being and substantive citizenship. CDAs are a 
collective form of organisation operating at the community level to 
address local problems not dealt with by government. It was suggested 
that CDAs act as a fourth tier of government, as a space where citizens 
collaborate to deliver basic interventions by pooling their own resources or 
engaging with government when further support is needed. 
There is generally a productive relationship between CDAs and LGAs: LGAs 
can step in and support community efforts while CDAs ensure that 
                                                          
10 CDAs may be registered with federal, state, or local governments, or with none 
of them. They do not need government permission to operate. 
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decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. This cooperation 
also provides information on community needs to the government. Local 
politicians also use CDAs as platforms to mobilise voters. LGA authorities 
welcome collaborations with CDAs in which they share the costs of 
delivery community development, effectively reducing expenses. These 
organisations can provide support to the LGAs in monitoring the 
implementation of projects in their areas: 
“[CDAs] are actually the ones on the ground, […] when they come 
together like that, they interface [with] the government […] you 
now have a meeting with the government to say ‘we need this, we 
need that, this is that area we know you can improve’. [CDAs] help 
government to get to where government probably is not. So, that's 
how they help to improve their own well-being. So if there are 
blocked drains, if there is flooding, other people will try to come 
together and solve the problems and escalate to the level of the 
government to say ‘come to this area, this place needs attention.”  
Their contribution is to give eyes to see that what has been given 
to be done to them is done as mandated. If you don’t do the right 
thing the community will report to the local government and the 
person in charge will be held responsible for whatever lapses. So 
that is the job of the community, they put eyes to see that what is 
to be done has been done as it should (25, LG, CS, M, Z).” 
Whilst CDAs are typically rural organisations, they have expanded to urban 
areas and undertake different activities and services according to the type 
of neighbourhood they are based in and the socio-economic characteristics 
(as social class) of residents. In middle class urban areas, these 
organisations are often associated with particular gated communities. 
Depending on the income and needs of a neighbourhood, CDAs may 
collectively supply specific services such as electricity, security, rotating 
loans, drainage maintenance and road repair. 
“So the process is very personal, sometimes people come together 
and form neighbourhood organisations that help achieve certain 
demands of good life. Some come together and put resources 
together and provide security for the neighbourhood. I live in an 
estate where we provide our own electricity supply. We don’t 
depend on government for our electricity supply, we guarantee 
ourselves 24 hours electricity supply because that is something 
that is a demand for our good lives. […] we pay a premium on it 
but it is guaranteed. […] So the processes of achieving well-being 
are more individual but gradually with the help of our democratic 
system, in states like Lagos more and more people are becoming 
aware of their rights as citizens and so are placing more demands 
on the government for the provision of certain basic infrastructure 
and amenities that will improve quality of lives (42, CS, PRO, M, 
L).” 
The following extract provides an overview of the range of activities 
achieved through collective action in these organisations: 
“We say, you are your own local government. The roads you drive 
on, you have to work it through collective effort, so you find 
neighbourhoods organising within itself. This part of town […] has 
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a Community Development Association which is responsible for 
maintaining and managing services within the estate. So when the 
roads are bad, usually the money the committee collects are used 
to fix them. […] The police are almost not in existence here but you 
have the private security firms which monitor the estate and 
provide some kind of security. […] In the area of water, sometimes 
communities come together contribute money and build bole 
holes to gain access to decent water. They also pay money to fund 
the vigilantes that provide security so that people can sleep well at 
night. In some other communities, people contribute money to 
build their hospital; there might be a place called a [public] clinic 
but when you go in there are no drugs or other things to take care 
of patients. There are cases where communities contribute money 
to pay doctors and nurses to provide health care services. They 
pay teachers to teach their children. Around the country so many 
citizens come together and act collectively to provide things that 
aid well-being. They manage their solid waste, drainages, some 
weekends they declare labour day and the young men in the 
communities come together to excavate drainages to keep away 
floods from their communities. They also manage their education, 
security and all of that. When you look at it from this point of view, 
those actions relieve the government of their responsibilities not 
as if it is meant to be like that but they have failed in providing for 
the citizens. In the more affluent neighbourhoods you see more 
people coming together to act collectively on security. The people 
uses several associations which they have formed to help the 
communities, these are self-help mechanisms the citizens in 
different parts of the country have formed to fill the gap created 
by government failure to address them (41, CS, NGO, M, L).” 
Each household a local government 
Whilst CDAs collectively provide services at a community level, another 
revealing discourse articulated by several interviewees is that “every 
household is a local government” due to the way in which they also 
provide for their own services, such as water, electricity, and security, 
which are not usually delivered by the local government:  
“Sometimes people will say that every house or every household is 
a local government on his own because you have your own 
generator because you cannot depend on public power supply 
which is irregular. So you spend money to run your generator 
whether it is run by diesel or by petrol. You have your own well or 
borehole, deep well for your own water supply. You have to do 
much more to try to secure yourself; your buildings will have 
burglar-proof [systems]. If you can afford it, you will employ 
security personnel or guard to keep watch over your house (19, 
Res, F, I).” 
Savings groups 
In a country with interest rates that easily rise above 25 percent and where 
people have little access to credit, savings groups and rotating funds play 
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an important role across different socio-economic groups. Sometimes 
these financial initiatives are not the only activities that these self-help 
groups undertake. Such groups are often also created in relation to specific 
identities such as place of residence, profession, religion, ethnic group, 
parent- and widowhood, and disability. 
Ethnic-based collective action and the role of traditional 
leaders  
In the context of different entitlements and discrimination based on 
indigeneity, collective action is strongly linked with ethnicity, particularly 
amongst non-indigene groups trying to promote their well-being. It is 
important to note that non-indigene communities have their own 
traditional leaders,11 who are often directly involved in promoting the 
collective action of their members. These actions can be broadly classified 
into three categories:  
■ Direct provision of services to members 
■ Internal administration of the community (traditional justice 
administration) 
■ Advocacy 
Direct provision of services to members 
For example, ethnic communities can build their own hospitals and/or 
clinics where their members have discounted rates and traditional leaders 
can intervene in case a member is unable to pay.  
Internal administration of the community (traditional justice 
administration) 
In order to solve various conflicts within the community, members prefer 
to seek solutions from traditional leaders rather than turning to the police. 
The role of traditional authorities in ensuring local security and providing 
justice is very important and linked to mistrust of police: 
“If someone steals my property, I just want my property back to 
me. If the chief proves to the person that he is wrong, the property 
would be returned to me. It doesn’t become evidence in the 
custody of the police to go to court and spend five years and at the 
end of the day you don’t know what happened to your property. 
Sometimes there are cases whereby the only thing the 
complainant wants is an apology to restore lost pride and this is 
the kind of relief they never get in the formal police sector so they 
go to the chief (31, CS, NGO, M, L).” 
A traditional leader in Zaria explained that in over 16 years he has never 
referred a case to the police, always solving cases locally. He argued that 
most crimes reported to him have socio-economic origins. If such cases 
were reported to the police, the guilty party would often be subject to 
bribes, bail money or court fees, thereby exacerbating their situation and 
                                                          
11 Examples are the leader of the Igbo and the one of the Yoruba in Zaria, or the 
leader of the Hausa in Lagos. 
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contributing to a vicious circle of crime. Therefore, this leader preferred to 
inflict public punishments intended to cause embarrassment and prevent 
such behaviour (3, CS, COMM, M, Z).  
Advocacy 
Ethnic-based collective action has an important function in terms of 
advocacy and political representation as traditional leaders of non-
indigene communities represent their constituencies in different arenas. 
Advocacy in these contexts is more important where the non-indigene 
group is located in a particular area or dominate a specific sector of the 
economy/profession, therefore having some shared interests to lobby for. 
Some of these organised non-indigene groups can become very influential.  
Collective provision of private security 
The collective provision of private security is worth noting here. Whilst the 
private provision of security is an indication of the state’s inability to meet 
such needs, interviewees nevertheless felt that everyone should play a role 
in security struggles. 
Collective provision of private security takes two main forms depending on 
the income levels of residents. Wealthier neighbourhoods gate their areas 
and hire guards, while poorer neighbourhoods resort to self-organised 
vigilante groups. However, these two forms of collective action on security 
require a ‘community’ to support them. Civil servants in Abuja observed 
that in their neighbourhoods no community-led initiative existed to ensure 
security, which they felt was linked to the lack of an established 
‘community’. 
Another interesting point was the extent to which some neighbourhoods 
collectively decide to limit their own freedom for security. Some gated 
communities establish curfews, not allowing anyone to enter or leave the 
area after a certain time, unless for an emergency: 
“In consensus we decided when the gate will be closed and 
opened in our community. The one to the main road is closed at 
seven thirty in the evening. There is another entrance which we 
close at eleven so, if you are outside after eleven, then you have to 
sleep outside (32, Res, M, I).” 
Religious organisations  
An important component of citizen practices to achieve well-being is 
participation in religious activities. It was pointed out that, while churches 
take care of the spiritual dimension of well-being, this spirituality has a 
very material aspect. Spiritual leaders primarily talk about material well-
being in their services: “They say let us pray for promotion and for jobs. 
People pray for a bigger car if you have a small one. They pray for the here 
and now. The paradise is secondary to the material immediate aspect”.12 
Interviewees also talked about the relationship between religious 
organisations, democracy and welfare. Religious organisations are 
                                                          
12 Based on discussion held with academics at Ahmadu Bello University. 
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increasingly putting pressure on government when it fails to provide 
services. Simultaneously, both Christian and Muslim organisations are 
increasingly providing services, such as hospitals and education facilities, 
to urban citizens. Such organisations also favour the formation of mutual 
services for their members. While religion can be a source of division,13 it is 
also important to note that regularly attending a place of worship can build 
bridges across different sectors of society and ethnic groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Interviewees highlighted that this is not always the case and that in Plateau 
State for example, the religious divide increased the indigene/non-indigene 
tensions. 
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POLICY FINDINGS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
This report has identified the perspectives of key stakeholders on main 
trends and key areas related to urban well-being, as well as the different 
conceptualisations of well-being used by stakeholders. The characteristics 
of policies for urban well-being as well as a number of policy concerns 
were analysed before a range of citizenship practices to achieve well-being 
were presented. The authors hope that the report may contribute to the 
discussion on the current discourses on urban well-being and adequate 
policy responses. 
While it is beyond the aims of this report and the limited scope of the 
research to provide detailed policy recommendations, four main 
implications emerged from the analysis:  
■ Considering the current trends in population growth in Nigerian cities 
and towns, it is important to question whether the current governance 
structure is effective to plan and manage city development in ways 
that enhances residents’ well-being. In particular, it is important to 
think about the division of roles of each tier of government and how 
city-level governance may enable complementary citizenship practices. 
This concern is not new: other research and voices in Nigeria (e.g. NBS, 
2012) have made this observation but this research supports its 
importance. 
■ This study highlighted stakeholders’ confidence in the view that well-
being policies should aim to create the conditions for increased 
economic growth which will in itself be the main driver of improved 
well-being. However, the extent to which current economic growth is 
creating employment and contributing to the well-being of most 
Nigerians is questionable in the context of growing levels of poverty. 
Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2012b) demonstrate 
that both absolute and subjective measurements of poverty indicate 
increasing poverty. Focusing mostly on the promotion of GDP growth 
and investment as a strategy for well-being can be contrasted with 
other countries with high levels of growth as well as a significant 
proportion of the population living in poverty but which are 
complementing their growth strategies with strong social policy 
measures. It would be important for Nigeria to implement strong 
social policy measures targeting the urban poor, which build upon the 
existing livelihoods of the poor rather than interventions that 
undermine them. 
■ Some of the existing policies and interventions analysed do not target 
all urban citizens equally. In particular, there are two processes of 
discrimination which must be removed to achieve the well-being of all 
urban citizens: socio-spatial inequalities and discrimination of non-
indigenes.  
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■ This research has revealed how the limited availability of public goods 
such as safety and security, as well as infrastructure and services, may 
affect urban well-being even in the presence of growing income levels. 
NBS data (2012b) shows that, in Nigeria, many more people than those 
captured by official standard statistics consider themselves as poor. 
One explanation given is that despite the availability of better incomes, 
the lack of adequate services and infrastructure may reduce the 
subjective experience of well-being. This research has demonstrated 
that there are a number of goods, services and infrastructure which 
are better provided or at least regulated by government but 
government performance is still lacking. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study has analysed the discourses and views of forty-five urban 
stakeholders strategically positioned at different levels of Nigerian society 
as well as existing literature and policy documents. The analysis revealed 
three main trends affecting urban well-being:  
■ Rapid demographic change that makes it difficult for government to 
respond with adequate planning and interventions 
■ A number of governance issues, particularly regarding power 
distribution, lack of city-level governance, and the role of the state 
■ The existence of stratified citizenship levels characterised by unequal 
access to services and rights based on socio-spatial discrimination and 
indigeneity. 
Electricity, congestion, housing, youth unemployment, security and health 
are a number of key areas which were raised during interviews in which 
the inadequate and unequal provision of goods and services, underpinned 
by these three trends, affect urban well-being.  
Well-being tended to be conceptualised as the achievement of basic needs 
through economic growth. At the same time, well-being itself was 
considered fundamental for productivity. Well-being was also understood 
through the broad notion of security. A final understanding of well-being 
was as social order. Policies for urban well-being presented three 
characteristics:  
■ Policies are underpinned by the notion of restoring social order, with 
chaos and disorder seen as a cause of ill-being 
■ Planning and policies are not for all; in particular they discriminate 
against those living in poverty and non-indigenes 
■ Government is seen as a provider of the enabling environment and 
infrastructure needed for private sector actors to deliver economic 
growth intended to lead to improved well-being. 
These characteristics were present in a number of policy concerns raised 
by stakeholders, including decongestion policies, transport and road 
infrastructure, social security for the unemployed, education and food 
security.  
A generally negative view of urbanisation emerges from the strong 
emphasis on stopping rural-urban migration as a way to halt urban growth. 
Finally the research has highlighted a range of very important citizenship 
practices to deliver goods and services essential to their well-being. These 
practices reveal the importance of autonomous collective action in the 
achievement of well-being. They also show the role that income levels and 
other social identities such as indigeneity play in such processes. While 
these processes mostly focus on the delivery of goods and services, in the 
context of a democratic government still in transition, they also become a 
platform for voice and the claiming of rights. 
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A number of problematic assumptions identified in this study needs to be 
unpacked and explored further by researching specific areas of concern. A 
key problem is not that insufficient planning takes place but that it is the 
wrong kind of planning, which serves some interests and not others, and 
further entrenches inequalities. As put by one research participant: “we 
can say after 54 years of independence in Nigeria, a lot of planning has 
already been done, and sadly a lot of the planning has been done wrongly” 
(31, CS, NGO, M, L). Another important area to explore regards the role of 
the state vis-à-vis autonomous citizens’ organisations in the process of 
achieving well-being. It is important that further research also considers 
the trends identified in the analysis of specific sectors, for instance, the 
relationship between well-being/ill-being and public transport, 
infrastructure, and displacement. 
Future URN research under the theme of urban well-being will address 
many of these concerns. A research project will examine the links between 
mobility, poverty reduction, social inclusion and urban integration in a 
selection of Nigerian cities to explore how current mobility-related policies 
and practices address equity concerns. Another project will use urban 
health statistics to look at the relationships between urbanisation, 
infrastructure services and health issues. Another piece of research will 
look at how participatory well-being assessments in low-income urban 
neighbourhoods can potentially contribute to the establishment of 
supportive networks as well as generate information for enhancing the 
accountability of public resource allocations. It will also explore the ways in 
which individuals and groups articulate their dimensions of well-being, and 
their strategies and pathways to expand such dimensions.  
A further project will investigate how low income urban residents are able 
to negotiate their interests in relation to urban infrastructure development 
in Nigeria, particularly with reference to infrastructure-induced 
displacement. A complementary project will investigate the hierarchical 
structure of Nigerian communities in terms of their experience of or 
exposure to crime, conflict, violence and injustice and assess how they 
diminish the well-being of urban populations. Finally, another piece of 
work will attempt to provide a better understanding of urban water 
poverty in Nigeria, particularly in the peripheries of large cities.  
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ANNEX 1: CITY PROFILES 
These short profiles provide basic information on the five cities where 
most stakeholders interviewed were based. It provides a background for 
the discussions presented in the report. 
 
CITY STATE ZONE POPULATION 
Kaduna  Kaduna  North Central  1.4 million  
With a population of around 1.4 million (2006 census), Kaduna is the 
capital of Kaduna state and one of the largest cities in northern Nigeria. 
The Kaduna urban area is rapidly expanding over four different local 
government areas. The city is marked by strong religious and ethnic 
diversity, although it has a significant Christian population. This diversity 
has been the context for recent political violence and social unrest. A 
small town during the pre-colonial era, Kaduna was established as an 
urban centre by the colonial government: colonial powers invested 
largely in developing Kaduna’s infrastructure (major rail and road 
transport routes, as well as markets) and the city became the capital of 
the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Kaduna also held strong 
commercial and trading functions. Nowadays, Kaduna acts as the 
administrative headquarters of Kaduna state. The city has strong 
transport links through state and Federal highways, and operates as a 
major economic node in northern Nigeria specialising in manufacturing, 
textile production, petroleum refining, vehicle assembling, brewing and 
food processing. 
 
CITY STATE ZONE POPULATION 
Zaria  Kaduna  North Central  400,000  
Zaria is a city also located in northern Kaduna state. The city was 
historically known as Zazzau and was one of the original seven Hausa 
city-states. With a population of 400,000 inhabitants (2006 census), 
Zaria is the second largest city in the state. The urban area of Zaria is 
composed of two LGAs. While Zaria is well connected with the rest of 
Nigeria through road and railway links, the city’s economy is largely 
based on agriculture. Zaria is considered a major distribution point for 
cotton, groundnuts and tobacco. Other economic activities of 
significance include the textile and manufacturing industries, as well as 
railway repairing. Furthermore, Zaria is the home of Ahmadu Bello 
University, Nigeria’s largest university and the second largest in Africa. 
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CITY STATE ZONE POPULATION 
Abuja  Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT)  
North Central  2 million  
Abuja became the capital of Nigeria in 1991. The city is located in the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The FCT is divided into six Local 
Government Areas. According to the 2006 census, the city of Abuja had 
a population of 775,000 inhabitants, but it is estimated that well over 2 
million people now live in the metropolitan area (Abuja is the fastest 
growing Nigerian city). The city mainly concentrates institutional, 
administrative and government functions. The headquarters of the 
Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) is located in 
Abuja, and the city acts as the regional headquarters of OPEC. In the 
context of the various ethnic and religious divisions that mark Nigeria, 
the Federal government came up with a plan to establish a capital on 
neutral ground. The chosen location is symbolic: it is an illustration of 
neutrality and national unity. Another rationale for selecting a new site 
for a Federal capital emerged from the desire to decongest Lagos. 
Following the oil boom in the 1970s, Lagos went through a phase of 
rapid urban growth, making the city highly overcrowded and 
dysfunctional. Abuja is an entirely planned city: although its site was 
designated since the early 1970s, the city was mainly built in the 1980s. 
The city’s masterplan was elaborated by an international consortium, 
composed by three American firms. It defines the overall physical layout 
and key design elements of the city that are evident in Abuja’s current 
urban form. Abuja is serviced and connected by a thorough road system 
and the city’s urban structure is complemented by the presence of a 
system of satellite towns such as Idu (the major industrial site) and Dei-
Dei (home of the international livestock market and the international 
building materials market). Abuja is known for being one of the 
wealthiest and most expensive cities in Africa. Many marginalised 
inhabitants are locating in the semi-developed edges of the city, and 
squatter settlements and towns have appeared rapidly in and outside 
the city limits. 
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CITY STATE ZONE POPULATION 
Lagos  Lagos  South West  9-20 million  
Capital of Nigeria until 1991, Lagos is a global megacity and port, and 
the largest urban area in sub-Saharan Africa. Located in the South-West 
geopolitical zone, Lagos has a complicated governance and 
administrative structure: Lagos refers to both a city and a state. In the 
2006 census, Lagos state had a population of 9 million inhabitants 
although this figure has been contested by Lagos state authorities, 
which argue that Lagos State houses more than 20 million people. 
Nonetheless, Lagos is regarded as one of the fastest-growing cities in 
the world, and UN projections illustrate that the city will become one of 
the most populous urban conurbations. Within Nigeria, Lagos has a high 
concentration of administrative, commercial and industrial functions: as 
a state capital, it retains governmental powers, and exhibits much of the 
non-oil related economic growth in Nigeria. As an urban agglomeration, 
Lagos is currently expanding inland, resulting in the formation of an 
urban corridor linking Lagos with cities in the hinterland, notably 
Ibadan. Lagos is also marked by a complex governance and 
administration structure: there is no single administrative unit covering 
the entire metropolitan area. Lagos thus effectively covers various Local 
Government Authorities within Lagos State. The urban settlements in 
the mainland expand beyond the area originally comprising the territory 
of Lagos and include several separate towns such as Mushin, Ikeja and 
Agege. The 1970s oil boom transformed Lagos by fostering a huge 
population explosion, fast economic growth and unparalleled rural 
migration. In turn, this resulted in the rapid expansion of adjacent towns 
and settlements, which led to the emergence of today’s Greater Lagos 
metropolis. Lagos’ history is illustrated through the layout of the various 
LGAs that comprise the metropolitan area; they also reflect the 
conglomeration of unique cultures that give identity to the city. 
Nowadays, Metropolitan Lagos refers to both the islands of the former 
Municipality of Lagos and adjacent mainland suburbs. In effect, 
Metropolitan Lagos is a statistical unit but not an administrative one; for 
statistical recollection purposes, Metropolitan Lagos includes 16 out the 
20 LGAs that compose Lagos State, it comprises 88% of the state’s total 
population and also contains semi-rural areas. Within Lagos’s complex 
governance structure, Lagos State government plays the dominant role, 
as it is responsible for the provision of several utilities: roads and 
transportation, power, water, health and education. 
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CITY STATE ZONE POPULATION 
Ibadan  Oyo  South West  1.4 million 
Ibadan is the capital of Oyo State. The population of central Ibadan, 
including five LGAs, is 1,338,659 (census 2006). However, the larger 
metropolitan areas which includes 11 LGAs has a population of 
2,550,593, making it the third largest metropolitan area in Nigeria after 
Lagos and Kano. At Nigerian independence, Ibadan was the largest and 
most populous city in the country and the third in Africa. Ibadan is 
located about 128 km north-east of Lagos and 345km south-west of 
Abuja. Its central location provides transport and economic advantages. 
The employment structure is led by retail trade, public administration, 
service and repair services and education.  
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ANNEX 2: ANONYMISED LIST OF 
INTERVIEWEES 
ANONYMISED LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
No Actor CS Type Gov 
Type 
Level City Gender 
1 CS PRO N/A N/A Lagos Male 
2 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Male 
3 CS COMM N/A N/A Zaria Male 
4 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Male 
5 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
6 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Male 
7 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Male 
8 Gov N/A PO STA Lagos Male 
9 CS PRO N/A N/A Lagos Female 
10 Gov N/A PO STA Lagos Male 
11 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Female 
12 CS NGO N/A N/A Kaduna Male 
13 Res N/A N/A N/A Makurdi Male 
14 Gov N/A CS STA Kaduna Male 
15 Gov N/A CS STA Lagos Male 
16 Gov N/A PO LG Lagos Male 
17 Gov N/A PO STA Lagos Male 
18 Gov N/A PO LG Lagos Male 
19 Res N/A N/A N/A Ibadan Female 
20 Gov N/A PO LG Lagos Female 
21 CS COMM N/A N/A Zaria Male 
22 Res N/A N/A N/A Abuja Male 
23 Gov N/A CS LG Lagos Male 
24 CS NGO N/A N/A Abuja Female 
25 Gov N/A CS LG Zaria Male 
26 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
27 Gov COMM CS FG Abuja Male 
28 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
29 CS NGO N/A N/A Lagos Female 
30 CS COMM N/A N/A Kaduna Male 
31 CS NGO N/A N/A Lagos Male 
32 Res N/A N/A N/A Ibadan Male 
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33 Gov N/A CS STA Lagos Male 
34 Gov N/A CS STA Lagos Female 
35 CS COMM N/A N/A Abuja Male 
36 Gov N/A CS FG Abuja Female 
37 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
38 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
39 CS COMM N/A N/A Lagos Male 
40 Gov N/A CS STA Lagos Male 
41 CS NGO N/A N/A Lagos Male 
42 CS NGO N/A N/A Abuja Male 
43 Res N/A N/A N/A Lagos Female 
44 Gov N/A CS LG Abuja Male 
45 CS PRO N/A N/A Abuja Male 
 
 
  
 
Urbanisation Research Nigeria (URN) is delivering research 
accompanied by data collection on key themes concerning 
urbanisation, urban development and the provision of 
infrastructure. URN will produce and disseminate thorough, 
relevant, interesting and readable research outputs which 
will contribute towards the evidence base for better 
urbanisation strategy, urban policy, and urban programming 
and management in Nigeria. 
URN falls within the four-year DFID-supported Urbanisation 
and Infrastructure Research and Evaluation Manager (UIREM) 
– Nigeria programme. It is implemented by a consortium led 
by ICF International.  
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